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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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20 December 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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CONTENTS

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting (Moscow PRAVDA, 28, 29 Nov 85; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 28, 29 Nov 85)	1
Resolution Published	1
Velikhov Speech	3
Shcherbitskiy Speech	5
Akhromeyev Speech	7
AUCCTU's Shalayev Address	9
Solovyev Address	10
Slyunkov Address	11
PRAVDA Editorial	13
IZVESTIYA Editorial	14
Gorbachev Discusses Results of Summit in Supreme Soviet Speech (M. S. Gorbachev; Moscow PRAVDA, 28 Nov 85)	16

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: 'International Situation: Questions and Answers' 29 Nov (Vladimir Pashko, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 29 Nov 85)	28
Moscow Ty's 30 Nov 'Studio 9' Program (Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, et al.; Moscow Television Service, 30 Nov 85)	32
Assessment of Geneva	32
'Political Obligations'	34
'Differences' on Arms Levels	34
U.S. 'Most Difficult Partner'	35
'Psychology' of Geneva	36
U.S. 'Not United' on Issues	38
U.S., W. European Relations	40
PRAVDA Review of Week's International Events 1 Dec (Nikolay Bragin; Moscow PRAVDA, 1 Dec 85)	44

USSR Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable' 1 Dec	
(Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, Nikolay Vladimirovich	
Shishlin; Moscow Domestic Service, 1 Dec 85)	47
'Necessary, Useful' Summit	47
SDI 'Toy' in Reagan's Hand	48
'Foundation for 1986'	49
Question of 'Control'	50
U.S. Reaction to Moratorium	50
New Approach to World Affairs	51

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR SUPREME SOVIET RESOLUTION ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

Resolution Published

PM272009 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 85 First Edition p 3

["Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Results of the Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting in Geneva and on the International Situation"--TASS headline]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 27 Nov (TASS)--The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having heard and debated the report by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, "On the Results of the Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting in Geneva and on the International Situation," resolves:

Fully to approve the activity of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium member, in implementation of the Leninist peaceloving foreign policy of the Soviet Union at the meeting with President R. Reagan of the United States, held in Geneva 19-21 November 1985.

The USSR Supreme Soviet notes that at the present crucial stage in international relations, under conditions in which mankind faces the choice between survival and the threat of destruction, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting was necessary and useful.

Taking into consideration the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for the cause of the maintenance of peace, the USSR Supreme Soviet regards as extremely important the mutual understanding reached between the leaders of both powers and expressed in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that in it there can be no winners. Of fundamental significance also is the acknowledgement by both sides of the importance of preventing any war between them -- nuclear or conventional, and the prepositions [polozheniya] that they will not strive to achieve military superiority.

At the above-mentioned meeting it did not prove possible to find solutions to the most important questions connected with the task of halting the arms race and strengthening peace, and major differences of opinion remain between the Soviet Union and the United States on fundamental problems. The results of the meeting, however, create possibilities for the transition from the present state of dangerous confrontation to the constructive search for ways to normalize Soviet-U.S. relations and improve the international situation as a whole.

Accords on the continuation of meetings between the leaders of the USSR and the United States and the activation of dialogue at other levels, and of exchanges and contacts in bilateral relations, on the acceleration of work at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms for purposes of preventing the arms race in space and halting it on earth, and on the lending of new impetus to efforts in other directions of limiting and reducing arms are called upon to promote this.

The Soviet Union is doing everything in its power to put these accords into practice and it expresses the hope that the United States will display the same responsible approach.

The USSR Supreme Soviet considers it now imperative to display mutual restraint, to renounce any action which would create obstacles on the road of talks, to strictly and conscientiously observe existing agreements in the field of arms limitation, first and foremost among them the 1972 treaty between the USSR and United States on limiting anti-missile defense systems which has no time limit and which is an important basis for strategic stability as well as for the whole process of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. Keeping space free from weapons is of decisive importance for the attainment of agreements on radical reductions of nuclear weapons, and in the long-term on their complete elimination by all nuclear states.

The USSR Supreme Soviet confirms the readiness of the Soviet Union to extend the moratorium it introduced on any nuclear explosions if the United States will take a similar step, and also to embark upon immediate talks on the conclusion of an international treaty on a complete and general ban on nuclear tests.

The USSR Supreme Soviet declares that the Soviet Union will continue also in the future to firmly and purposefully pursue a principled course leading to the removal of the nuclear threat and to the development of international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente [razryadka].

In the struggle to achieve a turn for the better in the world affairs, the USSR will continue to cooperate closely with its allies in the Warsaw Pact and with all countries of the socialist community and to assist as much as possible the strengthening of their unity, cohesion and solidarity and to build up and improve cooperation.

The USSR Supreme Soviet expresses the hope that all government, parliaments and peoples will multiply their efforts in the struggle against the arms race, in particular to prevent an arms race in space, and in the struggle for the cause of peace and international security.

A. Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Moscow, Kremlin, 27 November 1985

Velikhov Speech

PM281640 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by deputy Ye.P. Velikhov of Moscow Rural Electoral Okrug, RSFSR (vice president of USSR Academy of Sciences)--at 27 November joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet chambers]

[Excerpts] Esteemed comrade deputies! In Geneva Soviet scientists and experts, including myself, helped in our delegation's work and had many conversations with U.S. specialists and many press representatives--journalists and television commentators--and representatives of many public movements. All of them, including those who do not sympathize with us, noted the great importance of the complex of Soviet peace proposals that preceded the summit and created a favorable climate for it.

As the Geneva summit showed, the road to peace will be difficult. I can assure you that Soviet scientists will devote all their knowledge, experience, and prestige to the noble cause of preserving world peace.

Our time requires a bold creative quest for new approaches to the resolution of both our domestic problems and questions of international life -- a quest based on a profound and objective, genuinely scientific analysis. It subjects to rigorous tests the policy of all states, especially those which have the greatest economic and military potential and exert the greatest influence on world events. There are the tests of political farsightedness, accuracy in determining trends of social development, the consonance of a particular country's goals with the interests and aspirations of the majority of mankind, and maturity of strategy. The Geneva summit convincingly demonstrated to the entire world that we Soviet people have no doubt that we will pass this test with flying colors.

The problem of new world realities which require new thinking occupied a prominent place at the Paris and Geneva talks. It arouses enormous interest and meets with a positive response in the broadest circles of the world public. Essentially the Soviet Union has now come out as an active initiator of serious global dialogue on the vital problems of the day.

The fundamental question of ensuring peace and security requires a new policy. The possibility of using armed force to resolve political tasks has radically decreased. Strategic parity shackles the potential for aggression. Understandably, this does not suit reactionary imperialist circles, which do not want to come to terms with the devaluation of such an important and customary means of their policy. Hence the desire to find some kind of new forms for the use of force and to utilize the latest achievements of science and technology to that end. Hence the difficulties and delays in arms limitation. Hence the desire to find new spheres for expanding the arms race.

These circles are gambling mainly on creating for the United States an effective capability to deliver a first nuclear strike in the belief that only such a capability will give adequate weight to U.S. policy. However, it is quite clear that no modernization of offensive nuclear arms will resolve this task given the present-day level of nuclear parity, especially when the latest scientific research into the global consequences of a nuclear conflict is taken into account.

The search for a solution to this task on the road of implementing a program for strategic defense with a space-based echelon is also futile. The technical problems involved are exceptionally complex. It is no accident that the overwhelming majority of even U.S. scientists and specialists are extremely skeptical about the feasibility of the project for creating [sozdaniye] a space shield which would shelter America in the event of a nuclear war. Competent circles make an extremely restrained assessment of the experiments which have already been done in the United States. It is easier for a fanatic than for a scientist (provided, of course, it is not a question of those scientists who intend to derive material gain for themselves from the project) to believe in the Strategic Defense Initiative -- the so-called "star wars" program. But even if the idea of creating [sozdaniye] a more or less limited ABM system turns out to be technically feasible another fundamental problem still remains -- It will be much simpler for the opposing side to develop [razrabotat] cheaper and quite effective means of neutralizing the system.

At sharp turning points in history Soviet science and technology have resolved in very short periods of time such highly complex problems as the nuclear problem and the problem of creating missile equipment. And now, comrades, if necessary, we will resolve the new tasks rationally and on time.

We do not intend to help the Americans in their aggressive intentions or to sit idly by. With a sense of profound responsibility, basing myself on knowledge of the essence of the matter, I would like to reaffirm that Soviet science and design thinking will provide effective countermeasures economically and within a short time. I stress once again: Soviet science has resolved the most difficult problems before in a very short time, and it will resolve them now too. Certain circles in the United States hope in vain that, if they do not succeed in undermining military-strategic parity, they will succeed in halting the fulfillment of the programs for our socioeconomic development and progress. The Soviet Union has the necessary scientific and technical potential to prevent that too.

The development [razrabotka], testing, and deployment of the system for which the U.S. Administration is militating contravene the 1972 ABM Treaty. This will merely spur on the arms race and open the door to space for new types of strike weapons. It is impermissible to continue living with a stone-age mentality in the nuclear age.

The Soviet Union believes that the outcome of the competition between the two systems cannot be resolved militarily. Socialism will exert a decisive influence on world development by force of example. In order to do this we need a reduction in tension, disarmament, and the development of cooperation. This is an old truth, but today qualitatively new conditions have been created for its implementation. We have sufficient potential to conduct an equal and productive dialogue with the West on the creation of a new security system based on the principle that survival, the reduction of the burden of military spending, and the resolution of disputes by political means are a sphere of common interests.

The defenders of the "star wars" program in the United States believe that it will ensure a technological leap forward, increase the competitiveness of U.S. goods, and reduce unemployment in U.S. industry. Can capitalism really resolve its economic problems only in this way? Moreover, even these conclusions are by no means obvious. Thus, despite the development of SDI, the nucleus and pride of U.S. technology -- the semicon-

ductor industry -- is currently collapsing in the competitive struggle with Japan. In the so-called "Silicon Valley" alone 68,000 people have been fired in the last quarter. Soviet and many U.S. scientists believe that healthy economic growth can be ensured only on a peaceful basis.

At the summit the Soviet Union counterposed to the course of militarization with the course of creation and the course of both economic and scientific and technical cooperation. We call on everyone not to arm but to cooperate in space. We know that many scientists and congressmen in the United States support this idea.

We propose that the leading industrial countries working on the problem of assimilating controlled thermonuclear fusion take the following step in developing the foundations of a thermonuclear power industry -- building an international thermonuclear Tokamak reactor together to develop and demonstrate technological solutions. The idea for such a reactor was proposed and elaborated by Soviet scientists, and the project was jointly studied for 7 years by scientists from the USSR, the United States, Japan, and Europe. We note with satisfaction the positive reaction of the United States, France, and a number of other countries to our initiative aimed at the good of all mankind. We support the expansion of exchanges and contacts between scientists and students in the two countries and cooperation in the sphere of creating software for the introduction of computers into school education.

Our plans, both short- and long-term, are aimed at peaceful labor and creation. And as the draft new edition of the party program notes, "The CPSU proceeds from the premise that however great the threat to peace created by the policy of aggressive imperialist circles may be, a world war is not fatally inevitable. It is possible to prevent war and preserve mankind from catastrophe. This is the historic vocation of socialism and all our planet's progressive and peace-loving forces."

Soviet scientists will do everything in their power to ensure that this program task is fulfilled. (applause)

Shcherbitskiy Speech

PM281235 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 3

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by Deputy V.V. Shcherbitskiy of Kiev's Leninskiy Electoral Okrug [member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee] at 27 November joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities]

[Excerpts] The intense attention and excitement with which our people and the world's peoples awaited the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and then followed its course are quite understandable.

The Soviet Union's consistent, principled, and constructive stance at the talks attests to our party's unshakable loyalty to the Leninist peace-loving foreign policy course and its very great responsibility for the destiny of mankind.

Comrades! Even during the preparations for the meeting it could be seen that the U.S. Administration was making a biased and unobjective assessment of the state of affairs, intended to continue its policy of striving for military and technological superiority over us, and had no intention of abandoning its plans for the militarization of space. As you will remember, on the threshold of the meeting, for propaganda purposes, spokesmen for official Washington widely publicized their so-called "new" proposals for reducing arms and tried to substantiate charges that we had supposedly violated earlier accords, seeking to direct the talks by this distinctive "pressure" into a channel advantageous to them.

But, as we know, they got nothing by that.

Even before the Geneva meeting the Soviet Union put forward a package of constructive peace initiatives, ranging from the introduction of a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions to proposals to cardinally reduce nuclear arms and revive the spirit of detente. Our specific and judicious proposals appeared sound and convincing, as befits a great power conscious of its responsibility for the fate of peace. They met with a tremendous positive response in the world.

However, the U.S. side considers almost all our proposals unacceptable. In the situation which had taken shape the Geneva meeting and the direct and frank discussion which took place there were undoubtedly necessary and useful.

As the results of the meeting showed, the normalization and improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations are possible in principle, and it is necessary to strive for this, continuing work in this direction on the basis of our assessments and proposals. This would undoubtedly lead to improved international relations as a whole. Even though the differences of approach and assessment remained as before, and even though there are still serious fundamental disagreements on a number of key issues, the political results of the meeting should undoubtedly be considered positive.

The joint statement contained in the final document, that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, is of fundamental importance. The reaffirmation of the Soviet-U.S. accord reached in January of this year on the need to seek ways to prevent an arms race in space and to end it on earth is also of substantial significance.

As is known, the Soviet delegations' stand at the talks with the United States received full support and a high evaluation from the Warsaw Pact state leaders, as well as approval from many realistically minded politicians, scientists, and the public in other countries, including the United States.

Of course, we all realize that, in view of the White House positions, there is no real possibility at present of achieving mutual understanding on fundamental issues, particularly in the sphere of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" and arms reduction, or with regard to the SALT II treaty. Nevertheless, it is important to persistently continue holding talks among experts in Geneva with a view to finding mutually acceptable agreements.

At the same time, soberly assessing subsequent statements by White House official spokesmen, it is clear that they undoubtedly continue to express the interests of the military-industrial complex, which benefit from the arms race and, particularly, from the militarization of space. The U.S. President's recent speech to the U.S. Congress and then on the radio, his unconvincing arguments, and his attempts to justify his policy are clearly designed to deceive public opinion. All this gives us grounds for thinking that the U.S. Administration will continue to make efforts to achieve military-strategic superiority over us and will try to deal with us, proceeding not from the principle of equality but from a position of strength.

If this dangerous U.S. policy does not change and work continues on the militarization of space, then we will, of course, have to utilize all our potential and take measures together with our allies to reliably ensure the preservation of military-strategic parity. And this potential will undoubtedly be found. We must not and do not have the right to tolerate military superiority over us. Undoubtedly, all Soviet people will fully support this stand.

Akhromeyev Speech

PM280951 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by Deputy S.F. Akhromeyev of the Moldavian SSR'S Beltskiy Electoral Okrug (chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff) delivered at 27 November joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities]

[Text] Comrade deputies! At the meeting in Geneva the vital problem of today formed the basis of the discussion: the problem of war and peace, of preventing an arms race in space and ending the arms race on earth. It was possible to discuss this problem comprehensively, displaying a full sense of responsibility for the future of the world, thanks to our delegation's persistence. We are well aware that the other side did not by any means seek to make the problem of international security and nuclear and space arms the main problem for discussion.

In the 40 years since the war, the threat of nuclear war has more than once hung over the world. Throughout these years it has been possible to uphold peace thanks to the purposeful foreign policy activity of the party and the Soviet state and the single political line of all the socialist community countries. Peace has been preserved thanks to the fact that the CPSU and the Soviet people have waged a struggle against the unleashing of war and have at the same time strengthened the country's defenses. The prevention of war has become a result of the strengthening of the defense might of the USSR and all the Warsaw Pact states.

Of course, this was not easy for Soviet people. Considerable material resources have been spent on defense needs. But there was no other way. The correctness of this CPSU line has been completely confirmed.

Thanks to the party's efforts and the Soviet people's heroic labor, by the beginning of the seventies the Soviet Union had achieved approximate military equality between the United States and the USSR in strategic nuclear forces and other means of the struggle. The achievement of military equilibrium with the United States is the feat of the Soviet people and the CPSU and is their historical service to mankind.

On the basis of the reliability of our defense and the support of all the Soviet people, our delegation confidently pursued the party's line of strengthening peace at the talks with the U.S. President. The USSR's position on the vital questions of today was presented to the U.S. Administration at first hand. Perhaps this will make the U.S. side realize that strong-arm tactics are not the way to deal with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Armed Forces do not threaten anyone, and of course that includes the United States. The Soviet Union has never sought and does not seek military superiority over the United States and other countries. We are in favor, as was said at the Geneva meeting of approximate military equality becoming the natural state of Soviet-U.S. relations. Our Armed Forces and their integral part -- the Strategic Rocket Forces -- are maintained at the necessary level of combat readiness with the sole purpose of holding back a potential aggressor from waging war and defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and their allies. Soviet military doctrine is of a purely defensive nature in practice. Soviet military strategy and the operational, combat, and political training of the Soviet Armed Forces are also subordinated to the fundamental goals of our peace-loving policy, the prevention of war and the rebuffing of possible imperialist aggression.

The building of the Soviet Armed Forces and our entire military policy take place under the CPSU's leadership and are wholly subordinated to the general creative tasks of the developed socialist society. All Soviet Armed Forces personnel approve and support the CPSU's policy, which is aimed at strengthening peace and lessening military confrontation, and support the measures adopted unilaterally even before the Geneva summit meeting on imposing a moratorium on the further siting of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Soviet servicemen approve the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at the beginning of October this year for deep cuts in the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States, capable of reaching each other's territory, with, of course, a simultaneous ban on the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of strike weapons in space. We are profoundly convinced that not only in the political plane, but also in the military-strategic plane the creation [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of strike space systems must not be permitted. This would not only entail an accelerated, even unpredictable arms buildup in all salients.

It would create a situation in which crucial decisions would be taken automatically, in fractions of a second. The development of events could then become irreversible, leading to a nuclear war with all the ensuing consequences. The dangers of this situation for mankind are obvious. However, the talks showed that the United States is not prepared to resolve this task, the main task of today. The United States is not prepared (this has been confirmed by speeches by the U.S. leadership even since the Geneva talks) to give up its "star wars" plans. The commitment adopted by the United States at the Geneva meeting not to seek military superiority over the Soviet Union is as yet only words. The so-called counterproposals put forward by the U.S. side at the talks are basically designed to undermine the strategic equilibrium in favor of the United States, and lead not to a lowering, but to a raising of the level of military confrontation. As before, we are being offered a scenario whereby the Soviet Union must break up [sloamat] its strategic nuclear forces and begin to restructure them according to the U.S. model. At the same time the United States wants us to sanction the implementation of all the U.S. military programs planned for the next few years and even for the longer term. I would like to hope that the results of the talks will help the leadership of the United States and the NATO bloc to approach the vital problems of international security from more realistic standpoints. At the same time it is clear that as yet these problems

are far from a solution. That is why we must not rest on our laurels, but must continue the struggle against the threat of war in all avenues. In view of this we are watching imperialism's military preparations and persistently improving the combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

In the face of the military threat and strong-arm tactics, we will not waive our security interests or permit military superiority for the United States and NATO over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The imperialist forces' repeated attempts in this direction in the past have failed. They are doomed even more to failure now that we have at our disposal modern Armed Forces and a vast scientific and economic potential. If the United States launches a space arms race, the Soviet Union will respond to any challenge. We cannot be intimidated by any large-scale military programs, but we would not want them to be implemented. For all the complexity of the present international situation, the Soviet people's peaceful labor will be secure. The weapons they have entrusted to their servicemen are in reliable hands. For 68 years our Armed Forces have served as the reliable support of the Soviet state. Now too they are on constant readiness to uphold peace and reliably ensure the security of their motherland and of our friends and the implementation of the policy defined by the CPSU Program. (Applause)

AUCCTU's Shalayev Address

PM281135 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by Deputy S.A. Shalayev of the Komi ASSR's Intinskiy Electoral Okrug (chairman of the AUCCTU), at 27 November joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Excerpt] Comrade deputies! The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva was an important stage on the path of implementation of the peace-loving foreign policy course of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, a course which is once again expressed firmly and precisely in the draft new edition of the CPSU Program.

The results of the Geneva meeting were greeted with great approval in the international trade union movement. A special statement by the WFTU, which unites trade unions from 89 countries, notes that the WFTU warmly welcomes the important results of the meeting held in Geneva, a meeting which inspires great hopes for positive changes in the international atmosphere and inspires peace-loving forces throughout the world to step up the struggle to achieve concrete agreements on ending the arms race and strengthening peace and security. A high assessment of the results of the Geneva meeting was given by the leaders of socialist states' trade unions, major trade union centers in France, India, Belgium, and Spain, and influential sector trade unions in the United States, Britain, the FRG, and many other countries.

It is a great pity that the U.S. side at the Geneva meeting was not prepared to move toward the resolution of the most important questions of preventing the militarization of space and reducing nuclear arms. In this connection the working people and their trade unions stress the need to further step up the struggle for peace and the implementation of the large-scale Soviet proposals on this question and to give antimilitarist thrust to the antiwar movement to a still greater degree.

It is militarism, and above all the U.S. military-industrial complex and the bellicose politickers who have made the arms race their profession and the source of their income, in alliance with other Western reactionary forces, which are the main reason for the tension in the international situation, the chief retarding factor on the path to detente and peace.

It is militarism which is the strong point of imperialist circles in their offensive on the working people's vital rights and freedoms, including the rights of their biggest mass organizations, the trade unions; the strong point of imperialism's attempts to halt the process of renewal of the world and economic and social liberation of the peoples.

Today, in the developed capitalist countries alone, there are more than 30 million unemployed and 65 million people living below the official poverty line. That is, the huge profits of the military-industrial complex on the one hand, and the growth of unemployment, wage cuts, and the lowering of the living standard for many millions of people on the other. Even in the richest capitalist country, the United States, according to the Americans' own figures, one in seven of the population and one in four children are below that poverty line.

At a time when several hundreds of millions of people in the developing countries are hungry, 1.5 billion people have no access to medical services, and 200 million children have no opportunity to receive education, every day more than \$2 billion is spent on arms in the world.

In these conditions there are ever louder demands from the working people and their trade unions for an end to the arms race and a resolute turn toward the relaxation of international tension, for the expansion of mutually advantageous economic cooperation between the countries of West and East, which provides millions of jobs for working people in capitalist countries, and on the establishment of truly just international economic relations with the developing countries and the resolution of the very acute problem of their foreign debt.

The Geneva meeting creates new opportunities for the stepping up of the antiwar movement of all peace-loving forces and for ensuring that the new year 1986, which has been declared International Peace Year by the United Nations, the year when working people of all countries will mark the centennial of May Day--that this year is a decisive year in the struggle for peace and security.

Solovyev Address

PM281611 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition pp 3-4

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by Deputy Yu.F. Solovyev of Leningrad City's Petrogradskiy Electoral Okrug (first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom) delivered at 27 November joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Excerpt] Comrade Deputies! The results of the Geneva meeting convincingly confirmed the need for and usefulness of summit dialogue of this kind. Our delegation did a tremendous amount of work, which is fully approved by Soviet people and all progressive mankind.

I support the proposal to adopt a special resolution on this question.

It is important to note that it has proved possible to involve the U.S. President in the process of seeking ways of resolving the most complex problems of present-day international development. It may be said with complete justification that we for our part did everything possible in Geneva to give new impetus to improving the international situation, ending the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, preventing that race from being transferred to space, and improving Soviet-U.S. relations.

A great role has been played by the steps taken by the Soviet leadership since the Geneva talks. The Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact states' supreme leaders reaffirmed the allied socialist countries' principled course of continuing to do their utmost to achieve a turn for the better in European and world affairs.

The demand to prevent war has a particular meaning for Leningraders, who endured a most difficult blockade which cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Together with all the Soviet people, the working people of our city and oblast are proud that Lenin's party and the Soviet state are in the vanguard of the struggle for peace and for a radical improvement of the international situation and are showing determination and the ability to formulate specific measures to overcome the dangerous trends in world politics. Evidence of that is provided by the numerous far-reaching peace initiatives and constructive measures undertaken by the Soviet Union recently.

A move was made in Geneva toward normalizing bilateral relations with the United States and continuing the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, of such importance for world peace, notably by holding further summit meetings. The joint statement on preventing a nuclear war and renouncing the attainment of military superiority enshrined in the Geneva final document, is of principled importance.

We are well aware that our country's stance is based directly on the historical parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc.

It goes without saying that the maintenance of that parity and, thus, the success of the struggle to prevent nuclear catastrophe is directly linked to every Soviet worker's labor contribution to strengthening the motherland's economic and defense might.

Slyunkov Address

PM281249 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 3

[Abbreviated version of speech delivered by Deputy N.N. Slyunkov of Minsk Oblast's Minskiy-Sovetskiy Electoral Okrug (first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee), at 27 November joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities]

[Excerpt] Comrade deputies! Discussing the CPSU's preCongress documents, Soviet people are living and working with an increased interest in all the state's affairs, are imparting an effective, creative thrust to their work, and perceive with ardent approval the positive changes which are occurring in the country.

The party and the people are engaged in peaceful creative labor. But Soviet people are becoming increasingly alarmed at the threat of a new war. The problem of war and peace is the most acute of the problems facing mankind today. This is why the question which the highest organ of state power in the Soviet Union is examining today is of vital significance not only for the Soviet people but also for the peoples of the whole planet.

Expressing the Soviet people's will, the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo are persistently seeking new approaches to resolving the cardinal problem of world politics.

Together with all Soviet people, the working people of Belorussia's cities and villages followed with unflagging attention and with great hope the meeting in Geneva, which was a major political event in international life. The resumption of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue at the highest level after an interval of more than 6 years is of real significance. The destiny of all mankind depends on whether we live in peace with America or whether a nuclear conflict erupts.

The final document of the talks has been perceived with profound satisfaction in the country. Many points in the Soviet-U.S. joint statement accord with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the whole world. And, above all, the agreement that nuclear war and the desire to achieve military superiority are inadmissible. The accords on the development of political contacts and cultural, scientific, technical, trade, and economic ties have been greeted with understanding in our cities and villages. Of course, the most important thing now is for this agreement to be turned into practical deeds. And much here depends on the U.S. side. There is no doubt that the Geneva meeting can be an important landmark in the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations. A permanent and constructive dialogue between the two great powers would help to strengthen peace and to solve many problems common to all mankind. Our people await practical actions from the U.S. Administration.

The Soviet people learned with great regret that the U.S. leadership did not come toward us on such very important problems as the ending of the arms race and the nonmilitarization of space. This means that the threat of a new war, unfortunately, has not disappeared. You do not have to be a specialist to see the total groundlessness of the claim by its initiators and propagandists that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is a shield, not a sword. However, there are people in the West who believe this. And it is very important that the myth was exposed convincingly and intelligibly at the press conference in Geneva.

Our country is capable of making a quick and effective response to the space challenge, but that is not our choice. Space cannot be allowed to become an arena of the arms race. This would run counter to the vital interests of all mankind.

In Belorussia, where one inhabitant in every four died in the fire of the last war and where practically the entire production potential was destroyed, people know very well what war costs. Our people also know the cost at which peace is ensured. On behalf of Belorussia's working people we submit a proposal to approve the Soviet delegation's activity at the talks in Geneva.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM291211 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Nov 85 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Confidence and Optimism"]

[Excerpts] The work of the latest session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation was held 26-27 November in this atmosphere of high political and labor enthusiasm. The supreme organ of state power examined vitally important questions of creation and peace. It approved the country's plan and budget for 1986 and assessed the results of the recent Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva.

M. S. Gorbachev's report at the session convincingly revealed the close interconnection between the peaceful Soviet initiatives and the Soviet state's entire foreign policy and the peaceful orientation of our domestic policy and the creative content of the Soviet people's aspirations and concerns. It sets forth a principled assessment of the recent Soviet-U. S. summit meeting in Geneva in the context of the present international situation and taking into account the experience of the past, the prospects for the future, and the specific tasks we have to resolve.

The Geneva meeting, as the CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted, in examining its results, was a very important political event of international life. A fundamentally important result of the meeting was that the leaders of the USSR and the United States stated in their joint document that nuclear war must not be unleashed. They stressed the importance of preventing any war -- nuclear or conventional -- between the USSR and the United States and undertook not to seek to achieve military superiority. In that sense the results of the Geneva talks could have positive influence on changing the political and psychological climate in present international relations and on normalizing them and could reduce the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. The meeting laid the foundation for dialogue with a view to achieving changes for the better in Soviet-U. S. relations and in the world in general.

The USSR Supreme Soviet session noted that the Geneva dialogue, the path to which was long and hard, was necessary and useful and its overall balance was undoubtedly a positive one. But, of course, the real significance of everything on which the sides agreed in Geneva can only be manifested in practical deeds, in the determination to specifically seek to curtail the arms race, to prevent it in space, to normalize the international situation, and develop all-around cooperation.

The USSR's supreme organ of state power fully approved M. S. Gorbachev's activity in implementing the Soviet Union's Leninist peace-loving foreign policy at the Geneva meeting with U. S. President R. Reagan. The USSR Supreme Soviet stated in a specially adopted resolution that the Soviet Union will continue firmly and purposefully to steer a principled course toward eliminating the nuclear threat and developing international relations in a spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente.

IZVESTIYA Editorial

PM291309 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Only Correct Path"]

[Excerpts] All this graphically demonstrates the peaceful, creative character of our work. Our foreign policy aspirations and the Soviet state's international policy are also closely linked to the peaceful thrust of our domestic policy.

That is why the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies listened with such very profound attention to M.S. Gorbachev's report "On the Results of the Soviet-U.S. Summit in Geneva and the International Situation." And that is also why they discussed this report with an awareness of their very profound and, to be blunt, historic responsibility. The USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously adopted a resolution on this report, fully approving the activity of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, aimed at pursuing the Soviet Union's Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, at the meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan in Geneva on 19-21 November 1985.

The Geneva meeting represents the materialization of the CPSU Central Committee April plenum's foreign policy guidelines. The plenum, as we know, stressed the need for the all-around activation of the USSR's peace-loving policy across the broadest front of international relations. It called for every effort to be made to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from prevailing, stressed the urgency of ending the arms race and stepping up the disarmament process, and advocated the development of equal, correct, and civilized relations between states and the expansion and deepening of mutually beneficial economic ties. This approach fully accords with the interests of the Soviet people and the peoples of the socialist states and is greeted with understanding in other countries of the world.

In a period brief yet full of major international events, the Soviet Union has sought cooperation in the interests of peace with the widest range of states. We have proceeded and still proceed from the premise that the period of dangerous tension can only be overcome by the joint efforts of all countries -- great and small. But the reality of the modern world is that it contains states which bear a special responsibility for the character, course, and consequences of world development.

The USSR Supreme Soviet was guided by an understanding of this reality when it noted in its resolution that the Soviet-U.S. summit was both necessary and useful at the present turning point in international relations, under conditions when mankind is faced with the choice of survival or the threat of annihilation.

Mindful of the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for maintaining peace, the USSR Supreme Soviet considers highly important the mutual understanding achieved between the two states' leaders and expressed in the Soviet-U.S. joint statement to the effect that nuclear war must never be launched and that there can be no winner in it. The recognition by the two sides of the importance of preventing any war -- nuclear or conventional -- between them and the provision that they will never strive to achieve military superiority is also of principled significance.

The Geneva meeting failed to find a solution to the most important questions connected with the task of ending the arms race and strengthening peace, and major differences on problems of principle will continue to exist between the Soviet Union and the United States, but the meeting's results create an opportunity for moving from the present state of dangerous confrontation to a constructive search for ways of normalizing Soviet-U.S. relations and improving the international situation as a whole.

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CSO: 5200/1177

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

GORBACHEV DISCUSSES RESULTS OF SUMMIT IN SUPREME SOVIET SPEECH

PM281158 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 85 First Edition pp 1, 2

["Report by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee"--
PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts]

Comrades, the plan for 1986 illustrates graphically the peaceful creative character of our concerns. Our foreign political aspirations and the international policy of Soviet state are closely linked with such a peaceful trend of domestic policy. The foreign policy directives of the April plenum of the party Central Committee were a concrete expression of Leninist foreign policy at the present stage. The plenum underlined the necessity to activize in every way the peaceloving policy of the USSR on the broadest possible front of international relations. It made a call for everything possible to be done for the forces of militarism and aggression not to prevail. It underlined the urgency of halting the arms race, of stepping up the process of disarmament. It advocated the development of equal, correct, civilized relations among states, and the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous economic relations. These directives of the plenum were dictated by the times, specific features of the situation that has taken shape, and by the needs of the socialist policy of peace and progress. In its assessment, the Central Committee Politburo proceeded from the fact that as a result of the continuing arms race the degree of unpredictability of events increases. The possibility of the militarization of space marks an entirely new jump in the arms race, which would inevitably lead to the disappearance of the very concept of strategic stability, the basis of the preservation of peace in the nuclear age. A situation would be created when fundamentally important decisions, irreversible in their possible consequences, in essence would be taken by computers without the participation of human reason and political will, not taking into account criteria morals an morality. Such a development could lead to universal disaster even if triggered by mistake, miscalculation, or technical failure of extremely complex computer systems. In other words, the development of world events has reached a point where particularly responsible decisions are needed, when inaction or delay in action are criminal because the issue today is that of preserving civilization and life itself.

This is why we considered and still consider it necessary to adopt all measures to break the vicious circle of the arms race and not lose a single change to turn the course of events around toward an improvement. The issue today is posed in a supremely sharp and defined way. We must rise above narrow interests and recognize the collective responsibility of those states before the danger which lies in wait for the community of mankind on the threshold of the third millenium. It was precisely this approach that the April plenum of the Central Committee empowered us to adopt in implementing foreign policy. This approach fully meets the interests of the Soviet people, the peoples of the Socialist states, and as we became convinced, meets with understanding in other countries of the world.

Over a short period of time, but crammed with major international events, the Soviet Union has been striving to fact in concert with the very widest circle of states in the interests of peace. Our basis was and is that to emerge from the phase of dangerous tension is only possible through the efforts of all countries, great and small.

Over the past months, political and economic links among the countries of the socialist community have become significantly more active and deep. Long-term programs of cooperation in the field of economics and scientific and technical progress have been worked out; a mechanism of energetic, concrete links has been set up, and coordination of foreign policy activity is becoming closer.

The meetings of leaders of fraternal countries in Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, and Prague have become important landmarks on the road toward further consolidating the socialist community. Links with all socialist countries are developing and strengthening. Cooperation with states which have freed themselves from the yoke of colonial oppression and who are members of the Non-Aligned Movement is taking on a wider character. Significant steps have been made in developing relations with many of these countries. This is a factor of enormous significance in the troubled sea of contemporary international relations, a factor acting in favor of peace, equal rights, freedom, and independence for the peoples.

The Soviet Union also is putting effort into improving links with capitalist states. I would single out especially the recent Soviet-French meeting in Paris, during which substantial steps were taken to develop further bilateral cooperation, to strengthen European and international security, and toward a return to detente. We will continue to build our foreign policy on a multiplane basis, on the basis of firm and stable bilateral relations with all countries. However, the reality of the present-day world is such that it contains states which, by virtue of their military, economic and scientific-technical potential, and international weight, bear particular responsibility for the nature of world development, its progress and consequences. First and foremost such responsibility -- I stress, not a privilege but a responsibility -- is borne by the Soviet Union and the United States of America. If one approaches matters from these positions, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting which took place last week was, in the estimation of the Central Committee Politburo, an important event not just in our bilateral relations, but also in world politics as a whole.

I have already had occasion to speak of my first impressions of the talks with the U.S. President at the press conference in Geneva. The final document of the meeting, the joint statement, is also well known. Today, speaking at this session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I would like to appraise the results and the significance of the Geneva meeting in the context of the present-day situation, taking into account the experience of the past, and the prospects for the future and the tasks we have to solve. First of all I must say that the path to the Geneva dialogue was long and not easy for many reasons.

The U.S. Administration that came to power at the beginning of the eighties openly took a course toward confrontation, rejecting the very possibility of a positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations. I think that everyone recalls the intensity of the anti-Soviet rhetoric of those years, the "strong-arm" nature of the U.S. ruling circles. The joint efforts of many years to create the necessary minimum of confidence in these relations were committed to oblivion. Almost all the threads of bilateral cooperation were sundered. Detente itself was declared as being counter to U.S. interests. Having taken up a course toward military superiority over the USSR, the administration began the realization of programs for re-equipping the United States with nuclear and other arms. The deployment (razvertyvaniye) of U.S. first-strike missiles began in Western Europe. A situation was created which was fraught with a high level of military-political uncertainty and its attendant risks. And finally, in addition, the "star wars" program, the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" appeared. Washington seized on this idea, not giving much thought to the grave consequences which are inevitable in the event of its realization.

The idea of taking weapons into space is extremely dangerous for all the peoples of the world, without exception. But we know something else: This policy of the United States must inevitably lead to a clash with realities. That is what happened. The Soviet Union, together with its allies, stated clearly: Military superiority over us will not be permitted. Even among the allies of the United States there arose confusion in the face of this evident disregard for the interests of their security and Washington's readiness to put everything at stake in pursuit of the chimera of military superiority. This course aroused serious doubts even in the United States itself. The proclamation of the plan for the preparation of "star wars" resounded like an alarm throughout the planet. Those who thought that their line toward a confrontation would become the determinant one for international development were mistaken. I will add, perhaps, in this connection, that dreams of world domination are false from the outset. Both as far as the purpose and the means are concerned. Just as the idea of perpetual motion comes from a lack of knowledge of the elementary laws of nature, imperial claims grow from a picture of the present-day world that is far removed from reality.

The Soviet Union has coupled its firm rebuff to the U.S. line toward disturbing the military-strategic balance with the promotion of large-scale peace initiatives and a display of restraint and constructive attitude in the approach to the central issues of peace and security. By our initiatives, and these amount to quite a few, we have clearly demonstrated what we are striving for in the world -- aims which we call the United States and its allies to strive for. These actions of the USSR have met with the warm approval of the world public, and they have been highly appraised by the governments of many countries. Influenced by these factors, Washington has been forced to maneuver. A show of love of peace has appeared in the statements of the U.S. Administration. It has not been backed up by facts, but the very fact that it has been made is symptomatic.

At the beginning of the year, at our initiative, an accord was reached on new talks between the USSR and the United States, talks which were to interlink the whole complex of space and nuclear armaments, and to make their goal the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to end it on earth.

The atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. relations, to some extent, and the international behavior of the United States began to undergo change, and thus of course could not be taken into account when examining the question of the possibility of a summit meeting.

In making such a decision our firm premise was that at the talks, central place must be given to those questions which determine our relations and also the whole world situation, questions of security. And at the same time we took into account the political and strategic realities in Europe and in the world, the opinion of our friends and allies, the positions of governments and public circles of many countries, and insistent appeals to the Soviet Union to do everything possible so that the summit might take place. We realized how much hope was being pinned on this meeting throughout the world, and we took specific steps to improve the international climate and to make it more favorable for the meeting.

At the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva we put forward specific, radical proposals. What is the gist of these proposals? We proposed primarily to ban completely space strike weapons. We proposed this because starting an arms race in space, and even the deployment [razvertyvaniye] in near-earth space of antimissile systems alone, would not strengthen anyone's security. Covered by a space shield, nuclear attack weapons would become still more dangerous. The appearance of space strike weapons could turn the present strategic balance into strategic chaos; provoke a feverish arms race in all directions and undermine one of the most important foundations of its limitation, the ABM Treaty. As a result, mistrust among countries would grow, but security would be considerably reduced.

Further, together with a complete ban on space strike weapons, we proposed a one-half reduction of all existing USSR and U.S. nuclear weapons capable of reaching one another's territory, and to limit each side's overall number of nuclear warheads on them to a ceiling 6,000 units. That is a radical reduction, measurable in thousands of nuclear warheads. Such an approach is just: It embraces all the weapons which make up the strategic correlation of forces. It makes it possible to take into account the volume of the nuclear threat really existent for each side, independent of how and from where the nuclear warheads are delivered to their territory -- by missile or by aircraft, from one's own territory or from allies' territory.

We regard that 50 percent reduction of the nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States as a start: We are ready to go further, until complete destruction of nuclear weapons with the participation, of course, of other nuclear states also. Understandably, especial unease is provoked among the European peoples by the nuclear arms race. We well understand this unease. Europe is saturated with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union advocates complete liberation of Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical. But the United States and its NATO partners do not agree to this. Then we proposed starting merely interim solutions, later to be extended to further reductions. We are convinced that our proposals are in keeping with the European peoples' hopes of weakening the nuclear threat and increasing Europe's security. I want to stress the fundamental aspect of the matter: In three spheres of the talks -- on space, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons -- we are not making any proposals to the United States that would reduce its security.

Moreover, our proposals provide the opportunity for the resolution of such matters which the U.S. side also places among its "particular concerns". For example, much is being said about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. Our proposals envisage that the number of these missiles will be reduced; the proportion of their warheads [boyegolovka] within the overall level of nuclear charges [zaryad] will be limited.

Or, to give another example: There is much noise made in the West over the Soviet SS-20 missiles. We are proposing to reduce these considerably in the context of resolving the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The nuclear weapons of Britain and France are the stumbling block. They say that these cannot be discussed at Soviet-U.S. talks. We are ready to seek a solution to this: We propose a direct exchange of views with these countries regarding their nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposals have been met with a broad and positive reaction worldwide. Behind them is the prestige of the Warsaw Pact states who unanimously support our constructive stance. To a considerable extent, also in accord with our approach is the joint statement by the leaders of six countries -- Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, India, Sweden and Greece. The Soviet initiative was perceived with approval and hope by the communist and workers' parties, major public organizations of various countries and continents, world-famous scientists, eminent political and military figures. It received a positive reaction from the majority of parties in the Socialist International, not to mention the thousands of letters from Soviet and foreign citizens which arrived for me on the eve of and during the meeting in Geneva. I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to their authors for the good wishes, for the advice and support, for their profound and sincere concern for the preservation of peace. [applause]

On the eve of the meeting, the Americans put forward their counterproposals. This is, in itself, a positive fact. One of our numerous initiatives evoked a favorable response. Much has been written in the press about the essence of these counterproposals. I shall not repeat their content. I shall only say that they are proposals which only go half-way, and in many ways are unfair. They are based on a one-sided approach, obviously dictated by a desire for military superiority for the United States and NATO as a whole. But the main point is that the U.S. position does not allow for a ban on the making of offensive space weapons. On the contrary, they want to legalize their creation. The position adopted by the U.S. side on the matter of "star wars" is the main obstacle on the path toward an agreement on arms control. And this is not our opinion alone. The governments of France, Denmark, Norway, Greece, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia also refused to take part in the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." On the eve of the Geneva meeting, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the leaders of the USSR and the United States and some of its allies which considered it possible not to support this clear appeal from the world community. This is a fact, which, as they say, needs no comment.

One should, perhaps, also recall that there were powerful political forces at work in the United States, who were doing everything they could to at least emasculate the content of the meeting, to bring to nought its significance, even to wreck it. I think many people have fresh recollection of actions such as the testing of an anti-satellite system, the appearance of the battleship "Iowa", carrying long-range cruise missiles, in the Baltic, the forced deployment of Pershings in the FRG, the decision to create binary chemical weapons, and finally, the adoption of yet another record military budget, and so on and so forth.

The President was already on his way to Geneva when the letter from the U.S. Defense Secretary became known, which entreated him not to agree to any accord with the USSR that would confirm the treaties on the limitation of strategic arms and antimissile defense, in other words, leaving the United States full freedom of action in all directions of the arms race, both on earth and in space. But was the matter really limited to the Pentagon alone? A sort of order, given to the U.S. President by U.S. ultra-rightwing circles represented by the ideological headquarters of the Heritage Fund, did not escape our attention. The President was instructed to continue the arms race, not to give the Soviet Union the opportunity to switch funds to the realization of socioeconomic programs, and to strive, in the final analysis, to squeeze the USSR out of international politics. These gentlemen went so far as to set the U.S. Administration the task of forcing us to change our system and our constitution.

These are familiar themes, comrades. We have had to listen to all this many times already. In a word, there were a good many attacks. All the same, we made a decision in favor of the meeting with the U.S. President. We made it because we did not have the right to neglect even the slightest chance restraining the dangerous development of events in the world. We made the decision realizing that if we do not manage to start a direct and frank conversation now, tomorrow it will be a hundred times more difficult, and maybe altogether too late.

There is no argument, the differences between us are enormous. However, in the world today the interlinkage and interdependence between us are so great. The acuteness of the times we are living through does not leave the leaders of the USSR and the United States, the peoples of the USSR and the United States, any alternative but to comprehend the great science of living together. From our very first tet-a-tete with the President -- and such conversations occupied a great deal of the meeting in Geneva -- the question was directly posed that the Soviet delegation had come to seek the solution of the most burning problem which is at the center of international life, the problem of preventing nuclear war and curbing the arms race. As I said to the President, therein lies the basic point of our meeting and this will also determine its results.

I must stress that the talks in Geneva were at times very pointed, I would say frank to the utmost. Here it is impossible to outwit each other or to escape with political and propaganda cliches. Too much depends on these pivotal questions of war and peace. During the talks the U.S. side stubbornly insisted on the realization of its SDI program. We were told that the issue is of the creation of purely defensive means, which are allegedly in no way a weapon. It was said that these means will help to stabilize the situation and get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. It was even proposed that these means be shared sometime in the foreseeable future, to open laboratory doors to one another. We frankly told the President that we do not agree with such assessments. We have carefully analyzed all these questions and arrived at the unequivocal conclusion that space weapons are not at all defensive; that they are capable of giving rise to the dangerous illusion that a nuclear first-strike can be made from behind a space "shield," and a counterstrike be prevented, or at least attenuated. What guarantee is there that space weapons themselves would not be used as a means to knock out targets on earth? There is every indication that the U.S. antimissile space system is being planned not as a shield at all, but as part of a single offensive system.

Naturally, we cannot agree with the assertion that the space systems envisaged in his program are not weapons at all, just as we cannot rely on the assurance that the United States will share with us what they succeed in setting up in this sphere. If the laboratories are to be opened, then it is only for purposes of verification of compliance with the ban on the creation of offensive space weapons, and certainly not to legitimize them.

We are told of the desire to remove the fear of missiles, to secure the elimination of nuclear weapons overall. Such a wish can only be welcomed. It fully corresponds with the aims of our policy. It is, however, a lot simpler to eliminate these weapons without creating offensive space systems for this purpose. Why spend tens or hundreds of billions of dollars and pile up more mountains of space weapons along with the nuclear weapons? What is the sense in that? I asked the President, does the U.S. leadership really seriously suppose that while U.S. space weapons are being set up, we will reduce our strategic potential, and help the United States to weaken it with our own hands? It is useless to count on that. It is precisely the reverse that will happen. To restore balance the Soviet Union will be forced to raise the efficiency, precision, and might of its weapons in order to neutralize, if this is required, the electronic space machine of "star wars" being created by the Americans.

Will the Americans feel more comfortable if the echelons of space weapons planned by the U.S. is complemented in space by our weapons? People in the United States surely cannot hope that they will retain a monopoly in space. At the least, all this is not serious. However, the U.S. Administration is still not abandoning the temptation to try out the possibility of gaining military supremacy.

Right now, by venturing into an arms race in space, they intend to outpace us in electronics and computers.

But, as has been the case many times in the past, we will find a response. It will be an effective response, sufficiently quick and quite likely cheaper than the U.S. program. We also said this to the President with all clarity. [prolonged applause]

I think that new approaches are needed, a fresh look at many things and, the main thing, political will from the leadership of both countries, for a real upturn in our relations, which would serve the interests of the USSR and the United States and the interests of the peoples of the world. The USSR, and I stressed this in Geneva, does not feel enmity for the United States. It respects the American people. We do not base our policy upon a desire to encroach upon the national interests of the United States. I would say more. We, for example, would not want to change the strategic balance in our favor. We would not want this because this kind of situation will increase the suspicion of the other side and increase the instability of the overall situation. The way things are [zhizn skladyvaetsya tak], both our countries will have to get used to strategic parity as the natural state. We will have to reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient, from the point of view of its reliable defense. We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency is much lower than that which the USSR and United States in fact possess at the moment. And this means that weighty practical steps for the limitation and reduction of weapons are perfectly possible, measures which not only will not lessen, but strengthen security both for the USSR and the United States, and the entire strategic stability of the world.

How then is one to assess the main results of the Geneva meeting? The meeting was undoubtedly a significant event. Direct, clear and specific talks are useful; the opportunity to compare positions in a well-defined manner is useful. Too many explosive and acute problems had built up. We needed to discuss these seriously and attempt to move out of the impasse.

We value the personal contact established with the U.S. President. A dialogue between top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states. It is important that such a dialogue has taken place. In the present difficult times it is, in itself, a stabilizing factor.

But we are realists, and we must say straight out that at the meeting we did not succeed in finding solutions for the very important questions connected with ending the arms race. The unwillingness of the U.S. leadership to give up the "star wars" program made it impossible for specific accords to be reached at Geneva on real disarmament and, primarily, on the central problem of nuclear and space armaments.

The meeting did not result in any reduction in the amount of armaments stockpiled by both sides. The arms race is continuing. This cannot but cause disappointment. The USSR and the United States are still divided by major differences on a number of other fundamental questions concerning the world situation and the development of events in individual regions.

But we are far from belittling the importance of the accords reached in Geneva. I will recall the most important of them.

There is, first and foremost, the affirmation in the joint statement of the understanding held in common that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in one, and the pledge by the USSR and the United States to construct their relations on the basis of this indisputable truth and not to strive for military superiority.

We consider that this understanding, jointly affirmed at summit level, should in practice be used as the basis for the foreign policy of the two states.

As soon as it is recognized that by its very nature nuclear war cannot serve to achieve any rational aims, the stronger should be the incentive for preventing it, for ceasing the development [razrabotka] and testing of means of mass annihilation, and for the total liquidation of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. And the more impermissible it now is to open up new directions for the arms race.

Of course, the joint statement is not a treaty. But it is a fundamental declaration of the positions of the leaders of the two countries, which imposes many obligations. The USSR and the United States also confirmed in precise terms their pledge to promote the enhancement in every possible way of the effectiveness of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and they came to an agreement on joint practical steps in that direction.

In the current unsettled international situation this has no little significance for maintaining stability in the world, and reducing the risk of nuclear wars flaring up. The joint statement of the leaders of the two countries in favour of a comprehensive and total ban on and destruction of such a barbaric weapon of mass destruction as chemical weapons, has fundamental significance. I would like to hope that the United States in its practical policies will follow this important understanding. The accord of the leadership of the USSR and the United States to contribute jointly with other states participating in the Stockholm Conference to its early completion by adopting a document which would include both concrete obligations on the non-use of force and also mutually acceptable measures for strengthening trust, also goes far beyond the framework of Soviet-U.S. relations. One can only welcome the fact that as a result of the meeting a number of useful accords in many areas for the development of bilateral cooperation between the USSR and the United States have appeared. I think that they will serve as a good base for raising the level of trust between our countries and peoples, if of course one takes an attitude of care to what has been worked out, and if one develops everything good that is laid down in it and does not seek artificial reasons to refute it.

Special mention must be made of the significance of the accord achieved in Geneva on the continuation of political contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States, including new meetings at summit level. And so we are right in saying that the overall balance of Geneva is a positive one. The achievement of such a promising [obnadezhivayushchiy] result undoubtedly to a decisive extent was contributed to by the constructive, consistent policy of our country. At the same time it would be unfair not to say here also that in the position of the U.S. side at the meeting, certain elements of realism came through, which contributed to the solution of a number of issues.

Of course, the real significance of everything useful that was agreed on in Geneva can only become manifest in practical deeds. In this connection I want to state that the Soviet Union for its part intends, with all determination, not to slacken the pace and in the spirit of honest cooperation with the United States, to continue its attempts to achieve a curtailment of the arms race and a general improvement in the international situation. We are counting on such an approach being manifested also by the United States.

I am sure the work carried out in Geneva will then bear real fruit. [applause]

Such is our assessment of this event and its role in international relations. I am pleased to be able to say that this assessment is shared by our allies, the fraternal socialist countries, as the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Prague immediately after the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. summit negotiations, bears witness with utmost clarity. The participants in the Prague meeting stressed that the situation, of course, is still not a simple one. The struggle to improve it goes on, but the conditions of this struggle -- this one can say already today -- have gotten better. The meeting in Geneva is an important link in our long-term, joint, closely coordinated efforts which aimed to secure peace.

One naturally poses the question: How does one proceed in light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Geneva? As I have already said, we attribute great importance to the agreements reached in Geneva on holding new Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. I would like to stress that we do not approach this matter in a formal manner. What is important is not just the fact that there will be another meeting between the leaders of the two countries: The important thing is what its results will be. The peoples will await practical progress along the path outlined in Geneva; we shall strive towards precisely this. One must start preparing even now for the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, first and foremost in the sphere of practical policy.

In order not to make it more difficult to attain future accords, we are convinced that both sides must first and foremost refrain from actions which undermine what has been achieved in Geneva; must refrain from actions which would block negotiations and erode the existing factors limiting the arms race. This assumes, in particular, honest and precise observance of the agreement limiting antimissile defense systems, and further mutual observance by the sides of the relevant provisions of SALT-II.

The main thing, however, is of course to create the possibility for a genuine halt to the arms race and to start practical steps to cut the stockpiled nuclear arsenals. Does such a possibility exist? We are firmly convinced that it does. It does exist. It is true that at the present time our proposals, and the U.S. ones, on reducing nuclear weapons diverge in many respects. But we do not dramatize this fact. Compromise solutions are possible here, and we are ready to seek them. There is no doubt that with a development of events such as this, questions of reliable monitoring -- in which the Soviet Union has a very direct interest -- would also be resolved. One cannot rely on words here, all the more so when it is disarmament and the country's defense which is involved.

But in order to solve all these questions it is absolutely necessary to tightly close the door through which weapons might penetrate outer space. Without this a radical reduction in nuclear armaments is impossible. I want to say this with all responsibility, on behalf of our people and its supreme body of power. [prolonged applause]

An accord is attainable if it takes into account the interests of both sides. The stubborn desire of the American side to go on with the creation [sozdaniye] of space weapons can have only one end result -- the blocking of the opportunity of ending the nuclear arms race. Naturally, such an outcome would give rise to bitter disappointment among the peoples of the whole world, including, I am sure, the American people.

Today there is a real opportunity to sharply reduce the threat of a nuclear war, and subsequently to eliminate fully the possibility of one. It would be a fatal mistake to let this opportunity pass. We hope that what was said in Geneva about the SDI is not the last word from the U.S. side.

President Reagan and I made an arrangement to instruct our delegations at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments to speed up the talks and to conduct them on the basis of the January accord between the two countries. Thus, it has been reaffirmed by both sides at summit level: An arms race in outer space must be prevented by tackling this question in conjunction with a reduction of nuclear armaments. This is precisely what the Soviet Union will be striving for, and this is precisely what we are urging the United States to emulate. By fulfilling in practice the commitments we have jointly undertaken, we will justify the hopes of the peoples of the whole world. [prolonged applause]

The longer it goes on, the more acute becomes the question of ending nuclear tests, first and foremost because an end would be made to the creation [sozdaniye] of new and the perfection of existing types of nuclear weapons. Because, further, without tests, without modernization, the process of the dying out of nuclear arsenals and the phasing out of nuclear weapons would gradually proceed. Because, finally, it can no longer be permitted that nuclear explosions -- they have amounted to hundreds -- disfigure our beautiful earth, swelling the alarm as to how future generations will live. That is why the Soviet Union announced its moratorium on all types of nuclear tests through 1 January 1986 and is prepared to extend this moratorium if there is reciprocity from the U.S. side.

We await from the U.S. leadership a concrete and positive decision which would have a very favorable effect on the whole situation, which would in many ways change it and would strengthen trust between our countries. We asked this question of the U.S. President in Geneva. The answer was silence. In reality, there are no reasonable arguments against banning nuclear tests. In fact, there are no arguments at all. Sometimes reference is made to the difficulties of monitoring. But the Soviet Union has clearly demonstrated the total possibility of the implementation of such monitoring by means of national facilities. This year we detected an underground nuclear explosion of extremely small capacity carried out by the United States and not announced by it. We are ready also to examine the possibility of setting up international monitoring. Deserving attention in this connection are the considerations submitted in the message from six states proposing the creation on their territories of special stations for observing the fulfillment of an agreement on halting tests.

The whole world is raising its voice in favor of halting nuclear tests. At the UN General Assembly a resolution has just been passed calling for such a halt. Only three countries, the United States, Britain, and France, voted against it. This is worthy of deep regret.

But there is still time. I think that the leaders of the United States and the other nuclear powers will take the opportunity which has opened up, proceeding from the interests of peace, and will display the necessary responsibility. I should like to recall that our moratorium remains in force and we hope that the discussion of this question at the USSR Supreme Soviet will be assessed as an urgent appeal for a realistic and immediate ban on all nuclear tests.

Altogether, the Soviet Union proposes an all-embracing complex of measures which would block all the roads of the arms race, whether in space or on earth, whether in nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons. The specific proposals in this respect are known in Vienna, in Geneva, and in Stockholm. They remain in force and retain all their topicality.

Europe should be mentioned separately. The task of preventing the further raising of the level of military confrontation is more acute here than ever before. The European house is a house in common, where geography and history have closely interlinked the fates of dozens of countries and their peoples. The Europeans can only preserve their house and make it better and safer by collective efforts, following the sensible standards of international intercourse and co-operation. We proceed on the basis that Europe, which has given so much to the world in the fields of culture, science, technology, and progressive social thought, is capable of setting an example also in solving the highly complex problems of contemporary international life. The foundations for this were laid 10 years ago in Helsinki. In the final analysis, we are most deeply convinced that the whole world, including the United States of America, will gain from the positive development of the situation in Europe. We have been working and shall continue to work for the more energetic consolidation on the long-suffering European Continent of the principles and policy of detente, for overcoming the obstructions of the past and the consequences of the confrontation of recent years.

The Soviet leadership attaches serious significance to the Asian-Pacific area. The Soviet Union's longest borders are in Asia. There we have both true friends and reliable allies, from neighboring Mongolia to socialist Vietnam. It is extremely important to ensure that this area does not become a source of tension, a sphere of military confrontation. We are in favor of broadening political dialogue between all the states situated there, in the interests of peace, good-neighborliness, mutual trust, and cooperation. We welcome the position of the PRC opposing the militarization of space as well as its statement refusing to make use of nuclear weapons.

We are in favor of improving relations with Japan. We are confident that this is a real possibility. It stems from the simple fact alone that our countries are immediate neighbors. In removing the nuclear threat, in this fundamental issue, the interests of the USSR and Japan cannot but coincide.

The resolution of all these problems is within the powers of mankind today if its efforts and intellect are joined. New heights in the development of civilization will then be accessible. Militarism is hostile to the peoples; the arms race, which is whipped up by the thirst for profit by the military-industrial complex, is reckless. It strikes at the vitally important interests of all countries and peoples. This is why, when it is proposed to us that instead of destroying nuclear weapons we should spread the arms race to space as well, we say firmly: No. We say no because that step would mark a new and senseless waste of means. We say no because this means increasing the danger hanging over the world. We say no because life itself requires not a contest in weapons, but joint action for the good of the world. The Soviet Union is a resolute supporter of the development of international life in this direction. [applause]

At the initiative of the USSR, and with the participation of scientists from various countries, development has begun of the Tokamak thermonuclear reactor project, which opens up the opportunity of a radical solution to the energy problem. According to the scientists it is possible even this century to create a "sun on earth" [zemnoye solntse], an inexhaustible source of thermonuclear energy. We note with satisfaction that it was agreed in Geneva to continue this important work.

Our country has put forward for examination at the United Nations an extensive program for peaceful cooperation in space, for the creation of a world space organization which would coordinate the efforts of countries in researching the assimilation of space. The possibilities for this are truly inexhaustible. There are fundamental scientific research and use of the results in the fields of geology, medicine,

materials technology [materialovedeniye], the study of climates and the natural environment. These are the creation of a global satellite communications system, remote probing of the earth. These are finally, the creation and use of, in the interests of all peoples, new space technology, including big scientific orbital stations, various manned craft, and, in the long term, the industrialization of near-earth space. This is a real alternative to the "star wars" plans aimed at a peaceful future for all mankind. The Soviet Union came forward as one of the active participants in concluding an international convention on a system for the economic use of the resources of the world's oceans. The resolution of this task is also of great significance for securing progress in human civilization and for expanding and multiplying the capacities at the disposal of contemporary society.

We propose to the whole world, including the world of the capitalist states, a wide, long-term and comprehensive program of mutually advantageous cooperation, bearing in mind those new opportunities which are opened for mankind by the era of the scientific and technical revolution. And in implementing this program the cooperation of two states such as the Soviet Union and the United States of America could play a far from minor role.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: 'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS' 29 NOV

LD292255 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1715 GMT 29 Nov 85

["International Situation--Questions and Answers" program presented by Vladimir Pashko, Moscow Radio foreign policy commentator; with Spartak Beglov, NOVOSTI press agency political observer Vitaliy Chukseyev, TASS foreign news editor-in-chief; Vitaily Ilyashenko, Moscow radio correspondent in Britain; and international journalists Vyacheslav Laurentyev, Sergey Pravdin, Nikolay Agayants]

[Excerpts] [Pashko] The Soviet-U.S. summit held in Geneva last week inspired hopes for an improvement in the international situation. Clearly for this reason an enormous number of people are reexamining what happened at Geneva on 19 and 20 November. I am asking one of the direct observers of the events, the political observer of the NOVOSTI press agency, Spartak Ivanovich Beglov to tell you about it:

[Beglov] Since this was not the first Soviet-U.S. summit which I witnessed directly as a special correspondent, the substantial differences between the previous such meetings -- say at the beginning of the seventies -- and the recent one could not fail to strike me. The previous meetings took place on a wave of detente in relations between our countries, which made it possible for the leaders of the two countries to endorse results which were already practically concluded, to sign their names to concrete agreements, and primarily in such fields as limiting weapons.

However the recent meeting took place under different circumstances. It was preceded by a 6-year period of continuous worsening of relations between our two countries and the general situation in the world, due to the further sharp up-turn in the arms race imposed by the U.S. ruling circles and the course they took of confrontation with the USSR, other socialist countries, and the forces of national liberation.

The world had come to a dangerous point when it was particularly urgent and vital to mobilize the resources of common sense and political will in order to halt this process. Hence the great significance of the actions taken by the Soviet Union in order to clear the way to a dialogue between the two countries at summit level.

In the days immediately after the Geneva meeting the broad international public put forward its own weighty opinion on questions of war and peace.

We witnessed the handing over to representatives of the two states appeals from numerous organizations. A delegation of 50 pacifist organizations arrived from the United States with a petition signed by 1.2 million Americans. Earlier, similar appeals had come in from the leaders of six member-states of the Delhi Declaration, the World Council of Churches, the Congress of Nobel Prize Winners, the Pugwash Scientists' Movement, the Executive Committee of the Socialist International, and, finally, the United Nations General Assembly and its general secretary.

And this is what is particularly important to note. The program of action which they propose on a complete ban on nuclear tests, a freeze in nuclear arsenals, a refusal to militarize outer space and a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals has already met with a response either in specific actions on the part of the Soviet Union or in our country's proposals which have been addressed to the United States. This gives every reason to say that in the course of the summit dialogue which had just begun, the Soviet delegation expressed the opinion, the position, and the aspirations not only of their own country, not only of our people, but also the demands of the overwhelming majority of sober-minded people on the planet and of mankind's desire in general.

At the same time, when the press reported about the letter sent by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger to the President urging him not to reaffirm the previous accords with the USSR on arms limitation, correspondents literally bombarded McFarlane, the President's special national security aide, who had arrived in Geneva, with questions which were filled with alarm: Should one see this letter as an instruction to the President to carry out no other will than that of the United States military-industrial complex?

If I might now turn to the summit meeting itself, to what it contained, and to its results. Observers in Geneva were united in their opinion of the importance of the very fact that it had begun. We now know that the Soviet side used the whole force of its arguments, the force of common sense, and the force of conviction to demonstrate not only our profound interest in peace, but also the immense responsibility for the destiny of the world which lies with both states to give a profound analysis of the cardinal changes which have taken place in the world over the past decade, and which require a new approach and a fresh outlook on many questions of foreign policy.

The U.S. side put forward its own views and arguments, and the positions of the two countries were compared. This also explains the fact why so much time was spent at this meeting on *tete-a-tetes* between the two leaders.

The international public rightly attaches great significance to the fact that the results of these conversations were able to be reflected in a joint statement and, first and foremost, in the agreement expressed in this statement that a nuclear war must not be unleashed and that there cannot be a victor in such a war, which leads to the mutual commitment not to strive for military superiority. This is undoubtedly the main starting point in the results of the meeting, which is capable of exerting a positive influence on a change in the political and psychological climate in present-day international relations.

But, comrades, there is another side to the matter, and it must not be ignored if one is to assess the results of the meeting soberly and evenly. If a number of the important points in the joint statement which have been mentioned reflect certain elements of realism in the U.S. side's approach, then this realism, it must be said, did not induce the U.S. leadership to go its part of the way to the end.

The U.S. side is apparently still not prepared for big decisions in the field of limiting the arms race; primarily, because of its stubborn adherence to the idea of transferring the arms race to outer space and because of the unwillingness of the U.S. leaders to renounce the "star wars" program. In his conversations with Ronald Reagan, the Soviet leader consistently dismantled the cumbersome structure of the U.S. arguments in favor of "star wars." Space strike weapons are not capable of preventing the threat of a nuclear war since anyone who acquires the sword and the shield simultaneously gains the dangerous temptation to inflict a first nuclear strike from under the cover of a space shield. Why waste tens of hundreds of billions of dollars and pile up a mountain of space weapons as well as nuclear ones? Surely the U.S. side cannot seriously be suggesting that we will reduce our strategic potential while U.S. space weapons are being created? And surely the Americans won't feel comfortable if our weapons are added to the echelons of space armaments in outer space which are being planned by Washington?

No satisfactory response came from the U.S. side to these direct questions which were put by the Soviet leader when he was alone with the President and the other day when they were repeated for all to hear from the platform of the USSR Supreme Soviet. By the way, the idea of taking arms out into space is extremely dangerous for all the peoples of the world.

The fact that this position is shared by the world community is borne out by the following report from New York. At a session of the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly the United States found itself alone when it tried to object to criticism of the "star wars" program.

At the Geneva meeting the hope was expressed by the Soviet side that what was said on SDI was not the last word from the U.S. side. Incidentally, a radical 50 percent mutual reduction in nuclear weapons, on which both sides have agreed in principle, would become possible in conditions of the nonmilitarization of outer space. As far as specific accords in this field are concerned, they are perfectly attainable on the basis of a quest for a mutually acceptable compromise, but only if the United States definitely declines to bypass the other side in the arms race via outer space.

The international public met with satisfaction the agreement reached in Geneva to hold further Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. Both the Soviet and other peoples will expect a practical advance on the road toward what was planned in Geneva. For its part, the Soviet side does not intend to slacken its pace, to strive with every determination and in a spirit of honest cooperation with the United States to achieve an end to the arms race.

The Geneva meeting, therefore, was marked by the call by the Soviet side to U.S. politicians and to the common sense of all Americans to learn to think in a new way, to seek a new approach, and to take account of the profound changes in the world, to learn the art of living together.

The decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was adopted on Comrade Gorbachev's report on the results of the Geneva meeting, stresses that the Soviet Union will do everything expected of it to turn what has been achieved in the accord into practical deeds and expresses the hope that the United States will display the same responsible approach. There is still time and it must work for the benefit of peace.

[Pashko] Concerning the results of the Geneva meeting, I would like to draw your attention, comrades, to another quite substantial factor. It is well-known that ruling circles in the West assiduously hide the truth from their peoples about our country and represent the peaceful policy of the Soviet State in a distorted fashion.

This time they did not succeed in doing so. Through television millions of people witnessed what went on in Geneva. Comrade Gorbachev's press conference enabled people, independently and without it being set within propaganda, to see the differences in the approaches of the USSR and United States to the cardinal problems of security. The direct comparison of standpoints opened the eyes of many to the policies of the two states and made it possible to see it in an undistorted way. This comparison, let us say frankly, is not to the advantage of the West. It is quite obvious that after the Geneva meeting public opinion in the world has turned toward detente even more sharply. Naturally, the long-term significance of the Geneva meeting will be apparent later, depending on how the joint statement adopted by the sides is implemented. As it was again stated at the recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet we will do everything necessary to this end, and expect the same from the United States.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TV'S 30 NOV 'STUDIO 9' PROGRAM

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["Studio 9" program, presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, chief of a sector of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and Professor Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. We are meeting with you in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center in our traditional talk devoted to the most important events in world politics. Of course, no one has any doubt that the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan in Geneva was such an important recent event, and we will devote our talk today to precisely this topic.

Studio 9's guests today are Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, chief of a sector of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

I doubt whether it would be an exaggeration to say that the Geneva summit meeting was a most important one among such meetings. This is associated with the time at which it occurred. The world is now at a critical point. The decisions adopted by the leaders of states, primarily of the Soviet Union and the United States, are exerting the most serious influence on the course of historical and political processes and bear a direct relationship, one can say without exaggeration, on the destiny of mankind. The Geneva dialogue between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States took place precisely at such a moment.

I think that its entire significance will not be seen at once, but will reveal itself with time. Today we will try to discuss certain aspects, important aspects, of this event of outstanding international significance, in particular relying on the analysis made in the report by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Supreme Soviet session.

Assessment of Geneva

One must say that in familiarizing oneself with the reaction and assessments being provided now by politicians, ideologists, and observers, one encounters the broadest spectrum of such assessments, from extremely pessimistic ones to, I would say, even ecstatic ones. In this connection, I would like to begin our talk today with a question to you, Vitaliy Ivanovich. How can one, in reality, assess what took place.

[Kobysh] Something big can only be seen at a distance. Evidently, it will still take time to see the sum total of what took place in Geneva. However, it is now somewhat obvious that something important happened there.

I will venture to cite the report at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on the results of the Geneva meeting: The meeting in Geneva, this report says, has become a major political event in international affairs. A fundamentally important result of the meeting was the fact that the leaders of the USSR and the United States declared in a joint agreement: A nuclear war must not be waged.

I think that this is the basis and the main thing; although, of course, the results of the meeting are not unambiguous.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, I would like you to spell out the question: What does this ambiguity [neodnoznachnost] consist of?

[Kobysh] Well, it is obvious to everyone that the most important question today is to create a world where there will be no threat of war. Nearly everyone is coming to understand that this problem is concentrated, in this historical stage, on space not becoming an arena of military confrontation and on the nondeployment of weapons, any weapons, in space. Also connected with this is the fact that the primary task saving mankind from a nuclear threat -- will have a positive solution. Unfortunately, a move forward on this question was not achieved in Geneva. The U.S. President stuck to his position on the "star wars" program, and this is of course very regrettable.

On the other hand, what we have already discussed -- his recognition of the impossibility of a nuclear war in contemporary conditions -- and certain changes in the U.S. position in a realistic direction create opportunities for dialogue. It is essentially already under way and will be continued. This is the positive part of what could be achieved in Geneva.

One should of course also bear in mind the timing of this meeting. The timing was special. A few days ago -- or 2 weeks ago now -- the whole world, including we Soviet people, were astonished and shocked by the report that a volcanic eruption began near a Colombian town which no one had noticed before; and the town of Armero, with its several tens of thousands of residents, was in an instant burned and swept from the face of the earth as if it had never existed. I fear that the time has now approached when such an occurrence could be fatal and real for all of mankind.

This is a particular characteristic of our time; and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has continually stressed this feature of the situation in the world and stressed the danger of the brink to which mankind has now come. This is precisely why we so resolutely -- it was not easy and there were difficulties -- took the step of preparing for a summit meeting. This is the way it seems to me.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, in reactions of the world press -- the Geneva meeting is now the main topic of all world mass media organs -- we now come across statements that generally the business in Geneva was limited to verbal statements and to some psychological changes -- which are not important -- but the meeting did not produce more than this. Is this so?

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, I liked very much this call to discuss the constructive results of the meeting because constructive results were the main thing that everyone expected from the meeting; to talk very realistically, very soberly, without removing or adding anything just as the meeting is actually assessed in political documents adopted in our country.

'Political Obligations'

Let us begin, however briefly, with the political obligations undertaken at the meeting. Immediately after the end of the Geneva meeting, I appeared on Japanese television; they invited me to appear along with U.S. Professor Richard Pipes.

Pipes is not very well known in our country but widely known in the West for his offensive character. He is an ultrarightist, a former aide to Reagan on problems of Soviet-U.S. relations. The Japanese asked the question: Mr Pipes, how do you assess the results of the meeting? Straight qway, Pipes characterized the meeting negatively. The Japanese gasped and asked about the political obligations noted at the beginning of the joint statement. Pipes said: What is there special? Well, we agreed that a nuclear war should not be started, we agreed that we should not strive for military superiority over each other.

I have to say that later we argued with him, along with the Japanese. By the way, there is an interesting detail. Among whom did the meeting results immediately produce such a completely negative reflex? Among the ultrarightists, first in the United States and then in other Western countries. And that is also a signal, a symptom.

Vitaliy Ivanovich, you have talked about the most important political obligations that were assumed. Nuclear war was condemned. An undertaking not to strive for military superiority has been made, after 6-7 years of slipping toward a very dangerous brink in Soviet-U.S. relations as a result of the policy conducted by the Reagan administration -- a policy that had actually started earlier.

Pivotal issues in the meeting were the issues of arms limitations and reductions. That is an important fact. Unfortunately, we did not manage to solve the main problem; we did not manage to agree on preventing the militarization of space. On the other hand, we managed to confirm the January formula, the four-point formula: Preventing the militarization of space as an obligation for future talks and negotiations; stopping and, as specifically noted in the joint statement, preventing an arms race in space; stopping the arms race on earth; and reducing nuclear arms and consolidating strategic stability.

I think there is now a political and even an international legal basis for intensifying the struggle for preventing the spread of the arms race to space.

'Differences' on Arms Levels

Let us take specific problems in arms limitations and reductions. The two leaders have agreed that a new impetus will be given to the talks on space and nuclear arms being conducted in Geneva. The most important Soviet proposals have been laid on the table there. Soviet proposals have been submitted on banning the development of space strike weapons and reducing nuclear arms by 50 percent, down to the level of 6,000 nuclear warheads. The United States has laid its counterproposal on the table and has also accepted the principle of a 50-percent reduction. Naturally there are differences. Stating them very briefly, the differences lie in that the Soviet proposals cover all the nuclear warheads capable of reaching each other's territory; the U.S. proposals

cover just a part of them. Naturally they are not complete, and naturally they are limited. Nevertheless those are some points which can serve as basis for further work. The principle of a 50-percent reduction has been accepted; that is a constructive achievement. The principle of an interim decision on reducing intermediate-range missiles in Europe has been adopted. You know that very recently the Soviet Union proposed to solve this problem separately as an interim issue without linking it directly with space and intercontinental nuclear arms....

[Zorin interrupts] ...by way of talks with Britain and France.

[Zhurkin]... and also by way of talks or consultations, or dialogue with Britain and France. Here, too, there is a Soviet proposal and a U.S. proposal. There are differences between them. The main difference between them is that the U.S. is set against such a dialogue and is against British and French nuclear arms being counted. The joint statement lays the foundation for returning to these issues and discussing them again. Speaking about differences, about the search for compromise and the entire history of the talks, it should be remembered that we have recently marked the 16th anniversary of the beginning of talks on all these issues. The SALT-I talks began in Helsinki in November 1969. They were difficult talks. Our country stubbornly struggled for limiting and reducing nuclear arms. There were compromises in that struggle. I would say that there was not a single instance of an initial position of this side or the other being retained until the final agreement.

Agreement has always been reached by way of compromise. Naturally if agreement is reached on banning space strike weapons and preventing transfer of the arms race into space, it will open every wide prospects for serious, major, very large-scale decisions which may turn back very many dangerous processes.

U.S. 'Most Difficult Partner'

I will not talk about the complex of bilateral agreements. They are many. Some are small and others are more important. As a whole they represent progress. In principle, I shall say that, of the last 13-15 years, 7-8 years were used for building the infrastructure; in a way, they produced the fabric of Soviet-U.S. relations. It was very hard and difficult. The U.S. is the most difficult partner for producing such a fabric. The next 6-7 years were used to destroy the infrastructure. We did not destroy it. The process of, as it were, regeneration of this fabric of relations has now begun. This will be a very difficult process. It will be a long process; but the main thing is that it has begun. It has begun in some areas on a small scale, and in some areas on a larger scale. The main thing is that it has begun; the main thing is that there is some kind of movement.

A final point on the constructive results of the meeting: I have not yet spoken about agreement on many other disarmament issues, such as the nonproliferation of nuclear arms, the idea advanced recently by the Soviet Union on applying this pattern of nonproliferation to chemical weapons. The idea of the nonproliferation of chemical weapons and generally the idea of banning chemical weapons has been included in the joint statement. Stockholm, Vienna -- the list is too long to enumerate. I would like to speak about another aspect, which is difficult to put on paper: the political-psychological aspect. It is a fact that there was a kind of sigh of relief in the world

as a result of the meeting. It cannot be defined by any mathematical or statistical descriptions, but it exists. It is interesting that it is sometimes now being argued in the United States and in Western Europe about who had the greater success at the summit, one side or the other? Well, I think it is good that success, and not failure, is being argued and talked about.

But this is not the main thing. Our approach is different. Our approach is that what was achieved was achieved by both sides, and the importance and significance of the achieved agreements lie precisely in this.

[Kobysh] And this is something new in our relations with the United States in recent years; at least in the last 6-7 years when they were sliding down, down, down, and down. I think that generally our logic, the logic of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a powerful impression on President Reagan and those who surrounded him in Geneva, when he said: Strictly speaking, it is not very clear why -- as you say -- that to get rid of nuclear weapons on earth, one needs to begin designing [konstruirovat] new space ... [changes thought] electronic space structures, which are monstrous in their scale, cost, and threat to mankind. Wouldn't it be better just to take the weapons on earth and begin destroying them, primarily the nuclear weapons? With what could one oppose this argument?

Moreover, it seems to me that the Americans were very, very intrigued by the formula that was advanced regarding interdependence, the need to take into account each other's interests, and generally by the formula about national interests, which must not be contrary to the national interests of the partner, and particularly not threaten the security of other peoples. I think that the words about the Soviet Union being interested in the United States feeling secure were quite unexpected for them, although essentially there was nothing new about them. The more secure the United States feels, the better it will be for the whole world, including Soviet policy. This is so. This is the way the world is today and this is the feature of our time.

'Psychology' of Geneva

[Zorin] I would also like to stress one thought, a very important one. Psychology is very significant in history and politics; and this factor as you called it, which cannot be taken into account by mathematical descriptions, is an important fact of the Geneva meeting. After all, an abstract enemy is one thing; and a familiar partner -- with whom you have talked, whom you have seen, and whom, although you disagree, you know -- is another. This is a somewhat new situation in Soviet-U.S. relations, and a situation which has quite definite consequences that will evidently be realized.

Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I would, however, like to ask a question in connection with what we are discussing. It may be a difficult one, but nevertheless I would like to ask it. What do you think: Has the picture of the leadership of the U.S. Administration and its political philosophy changed as a result of the Geneva meeting?

[Zhurkin] Valenin Sergeyevich, the question is indeed a difficult one, but it is better to try to answer any difficult question -- even if one has to correct the answer later -- than to evade it. We need to answer this question.

I would begin with the very minimum. The picture has not become worse as a result of the meeting, at the end of the meeting, and after the meeting. This is a certain bare minimum, I would say.

But what comes next? Did President Reagan's philosophy change -- I think we primarily speak specifically about him -- or his political views, or his convictions with which we so decisively disagree? I do not think so. They have not changed. We must be realists.

After all, every politician has more than a philosophy, more than a conviction, and more than a political course. There is some element, some side to his personality as a politician which forces him constantly to correlate his convictions with reality, with realities.

It is a politician's good fortune when this correlation with reality confirms the correctness of his philosophy and the soundness of the political course which he implements and pursues. Now, when it is not confirmed, then a process of accommodation begins. This process can be very rough and backward. This process can be very limited. There can be attempts to break reality which lead to even greater failures and even greater difficulties.

Now let us talk about realities. After all, have the realities not changed during the tenure of the Reagan administration? Let us be frank about it. A frontal political assault was initiated against the Soviet Union and our friends and allies. What was the result of this assault? First of all its aims were not achieved, although far from everyone in the United States admits this, but the understanding is gradually sinking in. Second -- and I think that this is even more important -- more and more are understanding that these aims will never be achieved. Third, the threat of war has intensified, concern has intensified in the United States itself and in the whole world -- why speak only about the United States?

A need has arisen to somehow correlate politics with reality and to draft conclusions. We have observed these maneuvers and zigzags of official Washington for more than 1 and 1/2 years; how last year voluminous rhetoric was initiated and attempts were made to simply solve this problem verbally -- this profound contradiction between political aims and the fact that in contact with reality it cannot be achieved.

We also say how, over a period of several months, when they realized in Washington that rhetoric was not working and the realities continued to function, how they decided to add even more rhetoric and to solve this problem qualitatively with the aid of more words. This also failed. Besides, all of this occurred in a very difficult situation when the frontal political assault initiated against us had not ceased. The millstones of this assault continue to turn, because they are moved by powerful forces.

Now the conviction or understanding that you cannot talk away historical processes with words, that something must be done, began to germinate apparently very slowly, with great difficulty and in a very zigzag way. And so the United States, the U.S. President and political leaders under conditions of fierce struggle nevertheless made the decision to participate in this meeting. They took part in the meeting and certain agreements and progress, which we are talking about, were achieved.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, as we say in Geneva not everything went so smoothly during the talks themselves, if we take into consideration the position of the U.S. side in particular.

[Zhurkin] Yes, Valentin Sergeyevich, our state, our party always had its feet on the ground and assessed events very realistically. This realistic assessment rules that relations with the United States were difficult and will be difficult, that changes in a positive direction will be won through very complicated and multifaceted work and will be won in difficult struggle.

[Zorin] Mikhail Sergeyevich's statement about a moment of truth made a great impression on politicians and representatives of the world's press in Geneva; we all saw this. Particular attention was paid to this by everyone when he said it. Vitaliy Ivanovich, I would like to ask you to tell us what this formula has in store and why in your opinion it made such an impression on the world?

[Kobysh] Well because, I think, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put a great deal of meaning into a very precise, clear, and accurate formula. We have already noted that the world has arrived at a uniquely dangerous point in the history of mankind. Now the leaders of the world's two leading states -- the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States of America -- met.

We have previously heard many different pronouncements from the U.S. President. Undoubtedly the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was well informed about these pronouncements.

Yet nevertheless, they sat down together at the table and I think that many things became clear to both sides. This is most significant. It is that moment of truth which is possibly the last chance. As far as I understand, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee attempted to explain this to the U.S. President, and I got the impression that he found a response.

Vitaliy Vladimirovich said that the talks were hard, and sometimes there was plain pressure. The main difficulty -- and we have already partially dealt with it -- lay in the U.S. "star wars" plan. The essence of the matter is about the U.S. intent to gain military superiority and dictating its will from space not only to use, the Soviet Union, but to the entire world. How could we agree to that? And it was stated accurately and clearly to the U.S. President that as long as the U.S. does not give up the "star wars" plans, it will be very difficult in general to hold talks about anything.

U.S. 'Not United' on Issues

[Zorin] We hope that was the moment of truth for the U.S. leadership. Addressing USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about the Soviet Union's determination to act in the spirit of the Geneva agreements, make active efforts aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing its transfer to space. Good-will declarations after Geneva were also made in Washington. Yet you get the impression that not only influential U.S. circles, but even the administration in Washington is not united on these issues even now. I remember an incident in the Geneva press center when Reagan was already flying to Geneva, when he was on his way to Geneva. In the press center there appeared the text of the letter of U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger addressed to the President and written on the eve of President's departure for Geneva. In it Weinberger categorically insisted on a rigid position with regard to the Soviet Union, on not accepting Soviet proposals. This was assessed by those present in Geneva literally as a provocative act. Those who saw President Reagan when he arrived in Geneva noticed that he was very angry, vexed by the fact that the letter had been made public, and this produced a great impression....

[Kobysh interrupts] Do you remember the press conference given by his aide on national security affairs, McFarlane? That was simply an extremely strange show when the President's aide, answering correspondents' questions about who gave the secretary of defense permission to publish such a letter, just threw up his hands and said I do not know. When he was asked whether this had been done deliberately or not he said he did not know.

[Zorin] These facts are significant and show that there was no unity on the eve of the Geneva meeting. Even later events show that also after the Geneva meeting statements clearly hostile with regard to the Soviet Union have been made in Washington. Senator Malcolm Wallop, an influential member of the ruling Republican Party, said the following: I have serious reservations concerning annual summit meetings. They will lead to an undesirable improvement in climate and a reduction in criticisms of the Soviet Union.

In the end it is not a question of this or that politician. Such politicians exist and you can hardly correct them. The matter concerns who stands behind those politicians, what influential circles direct them. And in this connection I would like to quote for you, comrade television viewers, the statements -- I would even say admissions -- by the very influential and well-informed U.S. capital's newspaper, THE WASHINGTON POST.

The newspaper recently wrote as the following: Military contractors are seriously worried by the possible consequences of arms control. The U.S.-USSR talks may deprive them of profitable contracts. Many U.S. contractors fear that the systems of weapons they have designed and developed for years may become the object of Soviet-U.S. talks before the systems come to the profitable stage of full-scale production. I stress the point that this is written by a well-informed Washington newspaper. There is hardly any need to guess the kind of welcome given to the Geneva meeting by the boards of the largest military-industrial corporations, which not only obtain very large, multi-billion dollar profits now from arms sales, but also have large Pentagon contracts that will last for many years to come. The capitalist willing to give up his profits has yet to be born. And the influence, including political influence, of these circles in Washington is naturally very great.

But we should not overlook another circumstance. The list of 100 largest corporations in the United States includes many which either have no link at all with military production and are not listed as Pentagon suppliers, or are very loosely linked, and in these circles you observe completely different assessments, and more realistic assessments of the situation. There they understand the dangers of an uncontrolled arms race and the dangers for the U.S. economy. In a word, I think that it would be correct to expect that in the coming period there will be a strong political struggle in Washington in connection with the results of the Geneva meeting. And what the result of this struggle will be, only the future will tell. Speaking about the political consequences of the Geneva meeting, it must be kept in mind, that with all the U.S. influence and its role in the world, the U.S. is not the world itself. It does not represent the entire world. In international politics there are other factors, other forces, and I would like to ask you, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, to deal with this problem in connection with the results of the Geneva meeting.

U.S., W. European Relations

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, I would begin with Western Europe, because the mutual relations, interrelationship, and interdependence as well as the conflicts between the United States and Western Europe are some of the most important factors. And Geneva is located in Western Europe.

One American observer once said that Western Europe is afraid of two things. He was talking about the political leaders and the political leadership of Western Europe. First, it is afraid of very good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Admittedly, he added -- it was his opinion -- this did not threaten them. But more than this the political leaders of Western Europe fear the worsening, and a sharp worsening, in Soviet-U.S. relations, and therefore they viewed and followed with great concern -- despite their Atlantic solidarity and despite their interdependence -- the processes of the exacerbation of the international situation that developed as a result of U.S. policy and that were initiated in recent years by the United States.

Why? It was not only because of the elementary reason: Simply, that a military threat was dangerous to everyone. Perhaps this is particularly noticeable in Western Europe and generally in Europe. But also because this Atlantic solidarity becomes more rigid in conditions of exacerbation. In conditions of more rigidity, the grip of Washington becomes stronger. In conditions of the exacerbation of international tension, it is easier for the United States to dictate its will to its allies.

But the allies are becoming more and more independent. This is a large and long process, but generally it is moving in one direction: In the direction of more independence of the allies. Take the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program that we have discussed. In his address in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev named a whole series of countries that have dissociated or are disassociating themselves from the U.S. SDI program. Most of these are Western European countries.

Geneva has passed. The summit meeting in Geneva has taken place. And there was a sigh of relief. Maybe these are very mundane words, but it was the reality that we ourselves observed. Incidentally, remember comrades how Geneva, which has seen so much in its time and which nothing surprises, and Genevans, behaved toward us immediately after the meeting. Workers in transportation, in information centers, and at the airport showed us certain consideration.

[Kobysh] And even warmth.

[Zhurkin] And even warmth. And this was felt, this was sensed. Why, why?

First, the world has indeed become more secure after this meeting. Before our very eyes, it has become somehow more secure.

Further, we know perfectly well that Western Europe has in some things yielded to U.S. pressure when the matter affected their -- the Western Europeans' -- relations with the East, and resisted in others. Western European countries and the political leaders of Western Europe want normalization of relations with the East and want to develop relations with us. We have done this in a roundabout way, often quietly [potikhonku]. At times they clashed openly with the United States, at times they tried to somehow do

this quietly. But today the idea of the normalization of relations between the East and West has become legal, if I may put it that way. Today Western Europe can do this openly, directly, without concealing it.

There is another aspect which seems important to me. The myth of the Soviet military threat has somehow been devalued as a result of the meeting. If a mutual pledge has been taken not to strive for military superiority over each other and a mutual pledge has been taken that a nuclear war is impossible -- both a nuclear and conventional war -- this hews at the basis of the myth about a Soviet military threat. Again, this is a long process. We will not oversimplify it -- it has begun to hew at it -- and this has also affected Western Europe, and not only Western Europe, it of course has international significance.

And the last thing I would like to discuss: Two concepts of security have somehow taken shape in the world in recent years. One is individualistic, one of force, and selfish. This is to strive for one's security at the expense of others. Incidentally, the SDI program is an ideal and classic example of such an approach to security, when one wants to build one's security by denying security for others: Security at the expense of others.

The other concept is formulated in different ways in different countries. This is the concept of security for all. This is the concept of security that must be achieved as a result of joint efforts on the basis of equality. This concept has always had a much broader base in Western Europe than in the United States. But what is the philosophy of Geneva, the philosophy of the Geneva meeting, if one can put it that way? It is after all a philosophy of searching for ways of security not at the expense of others, but security on the basis of joint efforts.

[Zorin] This idea was most persistently pursued by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Geneva.

[Zhurkin] Yes, and it was heard. We saw perfectly well how the people of Geneva as well as the three or four thousand journalists -- the figures vary -- and just various figures from many political movements of the whole world who were in Geneva following the meeting, how they reacted to the Soviet approach. They reacted positively and with enormous interest, attempting to ascertain additional details. This was how they reacted to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's position at this meeting of the two leaders.

[Kobysh] I would like to speak about the same thing more or less, but from a somewhat different perspective. Western Europe was undoubtedly present in Geneva, but the Soviet delegation and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of course felt the fraternal assistance, support, and complete solidarity of the socialist communist states during every moment and every second of the talks with the U.S. President.

You know that we adjusted our positions and discussed them with our brothers from the socialist countries even before the general secretary left for Geneva. This occurred in Sofia, and you know that from Geneva he flew directly to Prague in order to describe what had happened and what prospects were being delineated.

It is most interesting that this time the so-called developing countries -- which it may be more correct to call liberated countries -- followed the meeting in Geneva with extremely great attention. In the past there were often such sentiments, that the

Soviet Union is working on some agreement with the United States -- such lines were seen in the press and propaganda of these developing countries -- but this has no direct bearing on us. This time it was different. This time everyone observed events in Geneva as if they themselves were participants in these talks.

And of course the position of China was an important factor at these discussions and during these talks. The fact that China joined our obligation not to be the first to use nuclear arms and the fact that China condemned plans for deploying strike armed forces in space was a serious factor, a material factor which was present in Geneva.

In a word, the reaction to what occurred is most diverse but in this case I would say simply it was approval.

[Zorin] Well we have in fact begun discussing the question of what comes after Geneva. Now I would like to ask you, Vitality Ivanovich to conclude this topic.

[Kobysh] I am not a prophet, Valentin Sergeyevich. Only life can now show how the Americans will follow the agreements that were reached in Geneva and to what extent the administration and Reagan will be able to oppose the pressure which they are being subjected to from the military-industrial complex.

But of course one thing is quite obvious, that we have entered a new stage, a new level of not only Soviet-U.S. relations but a new level of international relations in general. This course is reassuring and instills optimism. It seems to me that one of the essential conclusions that can be derived for the future from what took place in Geneva [changes thought] -- there are many ideas and forecasts on this score, including some very sensible and serious ones. A person like Robert McNamara, former U.S. secretary of defense who you know is a serious researcher, believes the result of Geneva will be that in about 18 months the United States and the Soviet Union will sign an agreement seriously reducing nuclear armed forces...

[Zorin, interrupting] This is his personal opinion.

[Kobysh] This is McNamara's personal opinion, although he is a serious scientist and researcher. We base ourselves on material factors, on precise Marxist-Leninist analysis of what has been and what will be, and generally we are inclined to consider that matters are heading in the right direction.

I think it significant that it became clear in Geneva that the wisdom of political leaders in our age, which is a nuclear age, that is approaching the third millennium lies not in outwitting partners but in seeking agreements which will not infringe or hinder anybody, that the strength of this political leadership lies not in flexing muscles but in possibly concealing those muscles altogether, and that the courage and political will of the political leaders lies not in issuing military orders but in possibly abstaining from these military orders entirely.

It seems to me that all of this was demonstrated so clearly that, as I have said, it made a sufficiently strong impression on the U.S. side.

[Kobysh] Of course. There is very difficult work, a struggle, ahead. As I was on my way to the recording session here I came across a very pleasant incident which may explain many things. I met an old acquaintance -- he is not an old man -- a worker. He asked me about Geneva and then showed embarrassment as he said: You know, Vitaliy

Ivanovich, when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev left for Geneva, my wife told me: If they agree there then we will have the second child we have been dreaming about. We are a little afraid of the complicated international situation, if they do not agree then we shall not have it. I showed interest and of course asked: So what happened? He became more embarrassed and said: There will be a second child.

[Zorin] Well although this is very much a fact of life, I think it is an incident with the great political meaning you mentioned. Of course you must realize that there are many difficulties ahead. So far President Reagan is showing no readiness to give up his idea of "star wars," and without that there can be no serious progress on the fundamental, key issue, on the issue of real disarmament. It is impossible and this was said very clearly and unambiguously in Geneva by the CPSU general secretary. But there are objective laws of history, and they have forced the U.S. leadership, which began its activity with violent anticommunist statements and steps aimed at worsening tension in the world, to switch to dialogue. Zigzags and departures from these positions will obviously be possible on this path, but the natural laws that have brought the U.S. leaders to Geneva remain.

They operate and apparently it is precisely these objective realities of our time, the objective realities which are taken into account and used in our party's policy, that will determine everything in the end. Our air time is up. The only thing remaining is to thank you colleagues for participating in our discussion, and our television viewers for their attention. Until we meet you again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

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CSO: 5200/1173

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA REVIEW OF WEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 1 DEC

PM301855 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 85 First Edition p 4

[Nikolay Bragin "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Following a Course of Creation and Peace

The second half of November was marked by important events both in the international arena and in the Soviet state's internal life. There was the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva and the 4th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, which took place this week.

Commenting on M.S. Gorbachev's report, the assessment it contains of the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting held in Geneva 19-21 November, and the Soviet Union's position on the most important international problems, prominent statesmen and politicians, many press organs, and ordinary people in various countries stress that an ineradicable impression is made on them by the Soviet Union's readiness to do everything possible to put an end to the arms race, achieve a turn toward lasting peace in international affairs, and deliver mankind from the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

Noting the Soviet Union's desire for a decisive change for the better in international affairs and for mutually acceptable, constructive solutions to the central problem of war and peace -- the reduction of nuclear arsenals and disarmament, press organs of the most diverse political hues single out the Soviet leader's words to the effect that given a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union has proposed "to reduce by 1/2 all the nuclear means in the possession of the USSR and the United States which are capable of reaching each other's territory."

"The general secretary," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, "called on Reagan also to follow the Soviet Union's example and stop nuclear tests, so as to strengthen the atmosphere of trust." At the same time, THE WASHINGTON POST observes, "the Soviet leader sharply criticized President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and described it as the main obstacle in the path of an agreement on arms control."

The Soviet Union's realistic, constructive approach to the resolution of the vital problems of the present-day international situation and the development of relations with other countries, including the United States, meets with understanding and support among all honest people on the planet, who demand that the opportunity which has opened up as a result of the Geneva meeting to firmly close the door to space for the arms race and

eliminate the arms race on earth should not be wasted. The meeting's positive results must be enshrined in practical deeds without delay, say prominent public figures, politicians, participants in antiwar movements, scientists, and representatives of culture.

"Political dialogue, not confrontation" -- that is how increasingly broad strata of the public in the United States itself formulate their aspirations. It is quite natural that both in the United States and in other Western countries attention has been drawn to the report's propositions which point to the bankruptcy of the "imperial ambitions" which are still current in the way of thinking of certain Western circles, and the need to seek new approaches to international life, the resolution of the key questions of war and peace, and the development of bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations. "The responsibility for the lack of progress in many spheres, as M.S. Gorbachev noted, rests with the United States," the presenter of a news program on America's ABC television stated.

The report, Britain's THE GUARDIAN writes, showed that "the Soviet Union does not intend to make any compromises in its opposition to the U.S. 'star wars' program. The Soviet leader again stressed that a real change in Soviet-U.S. relations...requires new approaches and a fresh look at many things."

Our country is not proposing anything that would weaken U.S. security. But the USSR will not allow the violation of the established balance in the correlation of forces in the arms sphere in favor of the United States. This tenet should be axiomatic for those circles in Washington which are involved in determining its foreign policy course, and above all its course in relations with the Soviet Union.

True to the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union proceeds on the basis that it is possible to emerge from the phase of dangerous tension in the world only by the efforts of all countries -- big and small. It calls on all states to recognize their collective responsibility in the face of the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe, to rise above narrow interests, and together to adopt measures to break the vicious circle of the arms race and open up the way to arms reduction and disarmament.

The Imperative of the Time

This responsible approach to the problem of war and peace on the Soviet Union's part is fully shared and supported by all Warsaw Pact states, as was again confirmed by the meeting of these states' leaders in Prague after Geneva. The communist and workers parties of the world are in solidarity with this approach.

The countries belonging to the Nonaligned Movement support the USSR's peace-loving actions and proposals on limiting the arms race and its concrete steps to normalize relations with the United States. The leaders of many of these countries have already stated that the positive results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva could have a beneficial influence on the situation in various parts of the world.

The members of the antiwar organizations in various countries and the WPC appraise highly the Soviet Union's contribution to the normalization of the international climate. Our country's appeal to the United States to learn the great art of living together has given new impetus to the quest for constructive approaches to the resolution of major and minor problems and questions which arise, both in bilateral relations and in the international situation in general, on the part of the most realistically minded politicians of the world. Nobody makes any secret of the fact that the

quest for the new is always difficult; but wasting chances and opportunities which arise in such matters would be unforgivable, criminal. An analysis of the world situation leaves no room for doubt that the development of events has reached the point where particularly responsible decisions are required.

Unfortunately, it must be noted that although the U.S. Administration is forced to maneuver on questions of war and peace, it is still tempted to pursue a "strong-arm policy" and test the possibility of securing military superiority over the USSR. Washington clings stubbornly to the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" -- the SDI -- which the peoples have rightly christened the "star wars" preparation program. The production of components for future space weapons is being launched increasingly widely. Billions of dollars are appropriated for these purposes. As U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger, one of the most implacable opponents of an end to the arms race, admitted the other day, the implementation of the SDI program will, according to Pentagon calculations, require at least \$300 billion in the next few years. At the insistence of the U.S. military department, space is being littered with devices and systems which have nothing to do with peaceful, scientific purposes.

All who are concerned about the fate of the world are worried about mankind's future and condemn and reject the U.S. plans for the militarization of space. The majority of the U.S. NATO allies have refused to participate in the U.S. "star wars" program. Only London and Bonn, yielding to pressure from Washington and tempted by the illusory prospects of obtaining profits from participation in the space arms race, have adopted a position which suits the White House, judging by the results of the meeting which took place this week between M. Thatcher and M. Thatcher and H. Kohl. Any participation by Britain and the FRG in the U.S. preparation of space-based nuclear strike weapons will be irreconcilable with the vital interests of the peoples of Europe, including those of Britain and the FRG-- and not only Europe's peoples.

By all appearances, the chimera of military superiority is giving certain circles in the West no rest, and robs them of the ability to look at things soberly and realistically. It is hard for such people to grasp the science of living together. But life itself makes their calculations illusory.

Major new disappointments lie in wait for those who imagine that the line of confrontation can be decisive in the development of the international situation. To live together, to live in peace -- that is the urgent imperative of the time.

In its resolution, the Soviet Union's highest organ of power declared our country's readiness to do everything to ensure that this approach triumphs in international affairs and that the nuclear threat is removed forever from society's life.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE' 1 DEC

LD011946 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 1 Dec 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, and All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

'Necessary, Useful' Summit

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed listeners! Ten days have already elapsed since the end of the summit meeting in Geneva, but the subject continues to dominate the world press, and indeed the life of our country, as was shown by the USSR Supreme Soviet session at which there was a broad discussion of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit. As you know, Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered a major report, debates were held, and the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision noting that at the current crucial stage in international relations and at a time when mankind is faced with the choice between survival and the threat of destruction, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting was necessary and useful. Taking part in our program today, as you already know, are Academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov and political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin. They managed to see Geneva, as they say, from the inside, by being there during the summit meeting. In this light, of course, their impressions are of particular interest.

[Shishlin] It would be appropriate to say a few words about the results of the meeting also. There is no need to try to show that the Soviet-U.S. summit itself was a substantial event; but the results, the final consequences of the Geneva meeting will, I think, manifest themselves not tomorrow or the day after, but will have an overall effect in the next few months and perhaps years. To get straight to the point, we should view the Geneva meeting, which was an event of truly world importance, not in light of the usual assessments of victories, defeats, success, or lack of success....

[Levin interrupts] You mean who was successful and who was beaten, yes, that is the wrong attitude.

[Shishlin] Yes, rather from the point of view of its essence. There were many things that dictated the need for that meeting; but perhaps the most overbearing was the fact -- and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has already spoken of this -- that we now in fact have reached the point in international life where we simply have to stop, take a look around, evaluate the situation, and take steps to reduce the danger of war, to

overcome this growth in international tension, and return to the path of detente. The meeting was businesslike, undoubtedly businesslike. It was frank, frank to the utmost. It was useful, undoubtedly useful. But, if you put the question differently, and ask whether at the Geneva meeting they managed to solve what could have been solved, then the answer would probably be in the negative.

[Primakov] Well, I do not altogether agree with that, because it would have been difficult to expect any specific decisions to be made in Geneva during that first meeting. The talks lasted a total of 15 hours, 5 hours of which were spent in private meetings. That is both a lot and a little. Then, in order to solve specific questions, what you need, of course, is for a certain positive potential to have accumulated in relations. That is how I would put it. To solve things straight out, just like that, is very difficult. I do not think that any serious politician expected that any specific questions to do with strategic arms would be solved; so I would not say the word "no".

[Shishlin] I would argue a little with you on that. What I had in mind here was the wide-scale plans for switching the arms race into space. Here, from the point of view of the fundamental approach to this problem, there was in fact no understanding.

SDI 'Toy' in Reagan's Hand

[Primakov] No, there was no understanding; and it would have been difficult to convert Reagan, so to speak, during those 15 hours of talks, whatever the arguments put forward to him. I am sure that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed all his arguments to him, and in quite a strong way. But, at the same time, you know that Reagan holds in his hands the Strategic Defense Initiative, as he calls it. Incidentally, he is now afraid of the name "star wars." He opposes it, precisely because the term fully reflects that idea. He prefers to speak of SDI, of some sort of defense system, but it is a toy in his hands: He wants to go down in history with it; and of course in 15 hours of talks, it would seem impossible to put him off it, impossible. But at the same time, I think that he did start thinking about what was said to him.

[Shishlin] At least one would like to believe that.

[Primakov] It was not only he who started thinking; but perhaps even more, those who in fact have a negative attitude toward the SDI. Not everything is so straightforward in the United States. There is a quite influential group of people there: for example, six former U.S. defense secretaries signed a letter of support for the SDI. Many people realize that this idea may lead to complete destabilization, to chaos in international relations, as Mikhail Sergeyevich said. After Geneva, that group, is, I think, becoming more active.

[Shishlin] I can agree with that, of course, because the asset side of the Geneva meeting probably turned out, in a certain respect, to be even greater than expected. At least from the point of view of the purely practical accords and the statements of principle that were made by the leaders of both countries, those statements of principle are of a binding nature, not just for our country, but for the United States as well.

[Levin] The renunciation of nuclear war as a means of solving political problems, the recognition...

[Shishlin interrupts] Not only nuclear, both nuclear and conventional...

[Levin interrupts] ...to prevent war....

[Shishlin interrupts] ...to prevent war in general between the USSR and the United States.

[Levin] In addition, it also is recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement that the talks being held in Geneva on nuclear weapon reductions should pursue strictly the aim that was clearly stated in the January accord: that is, to prevent the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons.

[Primakov] Yes, the point is that the January accord has been elevated to the very top and now has been signed by the leaders of the two countries. That already gives it a qualitatively new significance. At the same time, another very important thing was recorded, in that the sides renounced attempts to gain a military advantage. The United States is, by means of the SDI and other methods, trying to gain that advantage. I, of course, do not remotely think that over the period of a few days the United States has changed. That of course has not happened. But the summit meeting in Geneva was extremely necessary, and it was without a doubt useful, without a doubt.

'Foundation for 1986'

[Shishlin] Yes. Returning to the asset side of that meeting -- but not without reservations -- returning to the asset side, aside from the political statements recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. document, it is probably worth pointing out to our listeners the fact that both the U.S. President and the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee agreed that there has to be an acceleration in the talks being held in Geneva, those talks which embrace the whole range of problems, be it the prevention of an arms race in space or the problem of ending that race on earth. The joint Soviet-U.S. document records the desire by the sides also to promote progress at the Vienna talks on reducing arms and armed forces in Central Europe. It also reflects the desire by the sides to promote the success of the Stockholm conference on security and confidence-building measures. So, although one cannot place an unequivocal plus sign in front of what they managed to achieve and what transpired as a result of that profound exchange of opinions during the 2 days of the Geneva talks, what was done nevertheless creates a sort of foundation for 1986.

[Primakov] The point also is that the Soviet Union provided those talks with a constructive base; and it will be very difficult for the United States to move off that base, those foundations. It will find it much more difficult than before. We are not dramatizing the different attitude between the sides toward the question of a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and the U.S. proposal on that question. It may not suit us, and quite justifiably; but despite that we are not dramatizing things. We will search for some sort of compromise solutions based on bringing the positions closer together. Now it depends on the United States: If it also searches for a way to bring the positions closer together, then the talks on the 50-percent reduction may lead to success.

[Shishlin] Yes. And what is very important here is that the Soviet position with regard to strict control of decisions made on arms reduction has been disclosed in full. That position is absolutely constructive.

Question of 'Control'

[Primakov] You have just touched upon a very important issue. For what is it that we have always been accused of -- of allegedly seeking to steer clear of control? But what have they left now? For what will they reproach us now? What will they accuse of of now? We say we are ready for control, ready for all forms control, but only if what are involved are really solutions to stop the arms race. If the arms race continues, then there are no grounds for negotiating on control; that is wholly clear. But if we negotiate -- Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that in this case by all means, let there be control even on an international basis -- we are ready, as he said, to open up our laboratories also if we come to an agreement on not introducing weapons into space. Now their arguments will be very weak, you understand. This is why I say that it is very important that we should not only establish the desire, but should also put together a specific constructive base for this forthcoming agreement. This is very important.

[Shishlin] I agree with this; but I would like to add a further consideration, on a matter of principle: namely, that the Soviet Union, as Mikhail Sergeyevich declared, has no interest in the United States enjoying less security than the Soviet Union, just as we think that the United States should adhere to a similar approach. This is a very important position of principle; for, if we want to maintain international stability, and secure this international stability at an increasingly low level of armament, then only that kind of approach opens the way for adopting political and practical solutions relating to these problems of stopping the arms race.

[Primakov] This, in effect, creates a new philosophy of international relations. There is a theory of a game with a zero result, as it is called. There are some primitive politicians who feel that whatever is advantageous to the United States, for instance, must perforce be to our disadvantage; and vice versa, what is advantageous to us is perforce to the disadvantage of the United States. This is an instance of the so-called game with a zero result. This theory is well-known. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev totally refuted this way of going on, and proposed concerting interests, proposed finding areas of coinciding national interests; this means, it goes without saying, the objective interests and not the interests of any particular groups in the United States or of individuals -- that is, the national interests of the United States. So, he proposed finding the areas in which these interests coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union. When he said that it is, in fact, to our advantage that the United States should feel secure, this is the correct approach to international relations. This is the only correct approach at the present time.

U.S. Reaction to Moratorium

[Levin] I would like to return to an issue we have already touched on briefly, but which deserves greater attention, it seems to me: that is the issue of the moratorium on conducting nuclear explosions. As is known, the Soviet Union put a stop to all nuclear explosions on 6 August. At that time we proposed that the United States join us in this. We said that our moratorium would remain in effect until the end of 1985, but that it would be extended if the United States backed up our initiative. We are aware of the U.S. first reaction: We declare a moratorium, and within a few days they carry out a fresh underground nuclear explosion in Nevada. Yet, Comrade Gorbachev's report at the Supreme Soviet session contained the clear and resounding idea that our moratorium remains in force; and our invitation to the United States to join us in this also remains in force.

[Shishlin] Only with a proviso, insofar as our moratorium lasts until 1 January.

[Levin] Quite true. I was just about to say that the United States still has a month for reflection, as it is called. Incidentally, in regard to the control issue, Mikhail Sergeyevich mentions that we have registered, using our own national means, an underground nuclear explosion by the United States which it has not announced. Nevertheless, we say that national means can indeed operate; but if you insist on other methods of control, then, as you like, there are no questions from our side.

[Primakov] The main thing is to stop nuclear tests.

[Levin] Quite true. And what does stopping nuclear tests mean? On the political level, it improves the situation. But, it is of great significance with respect to the military aspect, too. Nuclear weapons just will not be developed, not at all.

[Primakov] There will be no further qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons, and then altogether, there will be no attempts to advance into any new spheres.

[Levin] And security will not be undermined; no attempts will be made to attain superiority over the other side. That is, once again, to return to the same fundamental issue we have been talking about.

New Approach to World Affairs

[Shishlin] Sometimes this matter appears to me as if some sort of young shoot of some fine plant came into being in Geneva, which in its development is capable of producing very fine fruits. However, by itself, this shoot may develop and produce these fruits only if it has not just one gardener and even not just two gardeners, the Soviet Union and the United States, but if the whole world community will be concerned about the shoot. In this respect, it seems to me that in assessing Geneva and in speaking here about Geneva, we should not forgo the fact that indeed the talks in Geneva were conducted by the leaders of two states, the United States and the Soviet Union; but in effect the whole world was present in Geneva and the demands of the today's world were present, which have really dictated the new philosophy and the new approach to international affairs, which has been so definitively stated by our country's actions, acts, and initiatives.

[Levin] It must be said that the whole world -- I have not seen a single speech by major statesmen and state leaders that has assessed the Geneva meeting negatively -- approves of the Geneva meeting. But the following issue arises: When we speak about the particular responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States, this is quite fair; but we by no means thereby remove other states' responsibility for the fate of the world.

This week there was a meeting between Thatcher, the British prime minister, and Kohl, the FRG chancellor. One of the subjects of their talks was participation in research work on that same U.S. so-called Strategic Defense Initiative -- that is, the involvement of Britain and the FRG in the SDI. True, some journalists have been expressing the view that while Thatcher supports the program 100 percent, there are some doubts about Chancellor Kohl's position. Well, these doubts may be dictated by domestic political considerations. As far as the Christian Democrats are concerned they are very actively in favor of the SDI.

I think that such actions in present conditions, especially against the background of Geneva, do not promote a development of the Geneva spirit. Such a term has also appeared; but everyone is very well aware that it needs to be filled with material content. I am speaking here of the fact that the development of these beneficial fruits of peace should indeed involve many states, virtually all states; it is necessary that all states approach the adoption of their decisions with particular responsibility and a responsibility that is dictated by the whole international situation now existing in the world. This support for the "star wars" program is a negative thing in the development of international relations and a brake hampering progress; although I repeat that both Thatcher and Kohl assessed highly the results of the Geneva meeting, considering that the meeting was necessary and useful and could produce good results in its development. But everyone's actions must be adequate...

[Primakov interrupts] Geneva is the start of the path, the start of a long and difficult path, along which there will be a struggle against those forces which are attempting to throw the world backwards.

[Levin] The USSR's position was very clearly set out both in the decision of the Politburo and in the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Politburo pointed out that in Soviet-U.S. relations the security sphere, the nucleus of which is the problem of averting the militarization of space and reducing nuclear armaments in an organically interrelated way, will remain the determining factor. The USSR Supreme Soviet stated again that the Soviet Union will continue in the future to firmly and purposefully pursue a principled course which aims to remove the nuclear threat and develop international relations in a spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente. We will continue to proceed along the path upon which our country embarked long before Geneva and during the Geneva meeting, the path of peaceful coexistence between states.

Here we come to the end of our broadcast. Thank you, comrades, for your attention. All the best to you!

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END